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wien

Comparative Political Analysis

210052 BAK7, 6 ECTS
Summer 2018

Course Details:

Friday, 15h00-16h30 (Hörsaal 32, Hauptgebäude, 1st floor, Stiege 9)
First class: 09.03.2018; Last class: 29.06.2018

Instructor:

Mariyana Angelova, M.A.
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Office Hours:

Fridays 17h00-18h00

Course Description:

This course provides an introduction into comparative politics in English. A central goal is to introduce students to basic theoretical and empirical concepts of comparative politics and exercise scientific writing. This is a highly demanding class, with a lot of reading and writing. The evaluation of the class will be based on students' active class participation, written weekly assignments, an open book exam, and a short term paper.

Course Requirements and Grading

The grading of the course will be based on the following components: **attendance, class discussion & weekly assignments (30%), open book exam (30%), and term paper (40%).**

Students who decide to drop out of the class have to **deregister until Friday 16.03.2018 23h59**. Please note that students who participated in the first class, miss more than 2 classes, and have NOT deregistered, will receive a grade "fail" at the end of the class.

Minimum Requirements: The minimum requirement is the completion of all three class components: 1) attendance, class discussions & weekly assignments, 2) open book exam, and 3) term paper (see above). This means that, in order to be graded, you need to complete each component (not necessarily successfully). For example, you can NOT master the class attendance, class discussions & weekly assignments section and the exam which make up 60% of the final grade and decide not to write the final paper or vice-versa.

In order to be graded class participants need to:

- 1) attend at least 13 out of 15 class sessions (first session is obligatory for everybody)
- 2) write the exam
- 3) submit their term paper, within the specified deadline

General Rules: Each written assignment (comments on Perusall, weekly discussion questions, research question and theory, literature search, draft paper, peer feedback) has a predefined deadline (see the session table). On time submissions of all written assignments increase the grade for the section, late submissions decrease the grade for the section. It is possible to submit written assignments after the set deadlines. Such submissions will be treated as late and penalized with a grade deduction. (For more detail see below.)

Each component (1) attendance, class discussion & weekly assignments, 2) exam, and 3) term paper) will be graded separately. The overall grade will be the weighted average of the grades from the three components, whereby it is not necessary that each of the components is successful. In other words, students are allowed to fail any of the three components, and can still pass the class as long as the overall grade is at least 4.0.

Plagiarism and Ghostwriting are strictly forbidden. To make sure that these rules are not violated on some occasions students will be required to provide an oral discussion of their written work.

Course Readings and Assignments (required readings only)

For more information (title, journal etc..) on the required readings and recommended readings see the detailed weekly readings list: pages 17-33.

Fridays 15h00 - 16h30	Readings & Assignments
Week 1 (09.03)	Introduction & Plan <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No readings • Recommended: Oakley (2014)
Week 2 (16.03)	Empirical Research I: Research Question and Hypotheses <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Powner (2015) Ch. 1 & 2 ► 4 comments (at least 2 questions) on Perusall due Thursday (15.03) 21h00 ► 1 question on Moodle due Friday (16.03) 11h00
Week 3 (23.03)	Empirical Research II: Literature Review and Research Design <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Powner (2015) Ch. 3 & 4 ► 4 comments (at least 2 questions) on Perusall due Thursday (22.03) 21h00 ► 1 question on Moodle due Friday (23.03) 11h00
26.03-08.04	Spring Holidays <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • take a break • work on your research questions
Week 4 (13.04) Research Topic	Comparative Politics: Overview <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tsebelis (1999) APSR • Caramani (2017) Ch. 1- Caramani (2017) ► 4 comments (at least 2 questions) on Perusall due Thursday (12.04) 21h00 ► 1 question on Moodle due Friday (13.04) 11h00 ► Research topic (one sentence) due Friday (13.04) 13h00
Week 5 (20.04)	Electoral Systems <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Chang and Golden (2007) BJPS • Caramani (2017) Ch. 10 - Gallagher (2017) ► 4 comments (at least 2 questions) on Perusall due Thursday (19.04) 21h00 ► 1 question on Moodle due Friday (20.04) 11h00
Week 6 (27.04)	Parties and Party Systems <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tavits (2008) BJPS • Caramani (2017) Ch. 12 - Katz (2017) • Caramani (2017) Ch. 13 - Caramani (2017) ► 4 comments (at least 2 questions) on Perusall due Thursday (26.04) 21h00 ► 1 question on Moodle due Friday (27.04) 11h00

Week 7 (04.05)	Voting Behavior <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Kedar (2005) APSR ▶ 4 comments (at least 2 questions) on Perusall due Thursday (03.05) 21h00 ▶ 1 question on Moodle due Friday (04.05) 11h00
Week 8 (11.05) Research Question & Theory	Research Question Discussion I <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Research Question & Initial Theory (500-600 words) due Tuesday (08.05) 21h00, on Moodle • read research questions by your peers uploaded on Moodle
Week 9 (18.05) Literature Search	Research Question Discussion II <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Literature search assignment due Tuesday (15.05) 21h00, on Moodle • read research questions by your peers uploaded on Moodle
Week 10 (25.05)	Legislatures <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) AJPS • Caramani (2017) Ch. 7 - Kreppel (2017) ▶ 4 comments (at least 2 questions) on Perusall due Thursday (24.05) 21h00 ▶ 1 question on Moodle due Friday (25.05) 11h00
Week 11 (01.06) Register Collaboration	Government Types <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Thies (2001) AJPS • Caramani (2017) Ch. 8 - Müller (2017) ▶ 4 comments (at least 2 questions) on Perusall due Thursday (31.05) 21h00 ▶ 1 question on Moodle due Friday (01.06) 11h00 ▶ Register collaborative papers by Friday (01.06) 21h00
Week 12 (08.06)	Legislative Politics in Parliamentary Systems <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Martin and Vanberg (2014) AJPS ▶ 4 comments (at least 2 questions) on Perusall due Thursday (07.06) 21h00 ▶ 1 question on Moodle due Friday (08.06) 11h00
Week 13 (15.06)	Supranational Institutions <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hix (2002) AJPS • Caramani (2017) Ch.23 - Hix (2017) ▶ 4 comments (at least 2 questions) on Perusall due Thursday (14.06) 21h00 ▶ 1 question on Moodle due Friday (15.06) 11h00

<p>Week 14 (22.06)</p> <p>In-Class Exam</p>	<p>Open Book Exam</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Literature: Powner (2015) (Ch. 1- 4) + 8 scientific articles ▶ Cheat sheet (your own) - 8 pages typed text (A4) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> → size 11, Times New Roman, normal margins (1,1,1,1), single line spacing → include page numbers and number the questions/answers → upload on Moodle by 22 June 2018, 15h00 → submit the copy you used during the exam along with the exam
<p>Week 15 (29.06)</p>	<p>Courts & General Discussion (Seminar Evaluation, Term Papers)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Caramani (2017) Ch. 9 - Stone Sweet (2017) • Carruba et al. (2008) APSR ▶ 4 comments (at least 2 questions) on Perusal due Thursday (28.06) 21h00 ▶ 1 question on Moodle due Friday (29.06) 11h00
<p>Draft Paper</p>	<p>Draft Term Paper due Friday 06 July 2018, 21h00</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ First draft of your term paper (min 1500 Words) on Moodle
<p>Peer Feedback</p>	<p>Peer Feedback due Friday, 13 July 2018, 21h00</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Written feedback on 2 draft papers by peers on Moodle
<p>Final Paper</p>	<p>Final Term Paper due Tuesday, 31 July 2018, 21h00</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Term paper (3000-4000 words) in a Word and a Pdf format on Moodle ▶ If you wish to get your grades before 31 July 2018, submit your term papers at the latest by Tuesday 17 July 2018 21h00

Important Deadlines Overview:

- **Weekly deadlines**

- Comment on Perusall (4 comments, at least 2 questions): every Thursday by 21h00, first time 16.03.2018, last time 29.06.2018 (Perusall)
- Discussion Questions (at least one): every Friday by 11h00, first time 16.13.2018, last time 29.06.2018 (Moodle)

- **Other deadlines**

- Research Topic: week 4, Friday, 13 April 2018 13h00 (Moodle)
- Research Question & Initial Theory (500-600 words): week 8, Tuesday 08 May 2018 21h00 (Moodle)
- Literature Search: week 9, Tuesday, 15 May 2018 21h00 (Moodle)
- Register Collaboration: week 11, Friday, 01 June 2018 21h00 (Moodle)
- Open Book In-Class Exam: week 14, Friday, 22 June 2018
- First Draft Term Paper (min 1500 words): Friday, 06 July 2018 21h00 (Moodle)
- Written feedback on two draft papers: Friday, 13 July 2018 21h00 (Moodle)
- Final Term Paper (3000-4000 words): Tuesday, 31 July 2018 21h00 (Moodle)

Course Structure:

Attendance

Students can miss up to maximum two classes during the semester.

Required Readings & Participation in Class Discussions

Students are expected to read every week the required readings and participate in class discussions. This means that you should be prepared to summarize and discuss any required reading when called upon. These summaries should discuss the puzzle, the research question, describe the approaches, key arguments, and the results provided in the required readings.

The first two substantive sessions will deal with practical approaches to empirical research and writing in political science. For this purpose, we will cover the first four chapters from Powner (2015) (see references below). Here we will learn what is a research topic, how to generate research questions, how to develop hypotheses, and how to structure our research design. Students can use this knowledge for scientific reading and writing in this class, as well as outside of it. Note that we can not cover the whole book by Powner (2015), but it is highly recommended that students find the time to read it. This will save you a lot of effort and time as you proceed in your studies.

The remaining part of the class will discuss selected topics from comparative politics: party systems, electoral systems, voting behavior, legislatures, governments, legislative politics, supranational institutions, and courts. Most sessions will be based on two texts. The first text is usually from the lecture book by Caramani (2017), which provides an overview into a given subtopic and should give a wide background for the understanding and discussion of the scientific articles. The remaining readings(s) are a selection of seminal scientific articles from top political science journals like the American Journal of Political Science and the American Political Science Review.

The required chapters from Powner (2015) and the scientific articles selected for this class will be the primary focus of class discussions, weekly assignments, and the open book exam. The accompanying chapters from Caramani (2017) should help you navigate through the articles (e.g. clarify some of the used terminology) but will NOT be included in the weekly assignments and the open book exam.

Weekly Assignments: Weekly Readings Annotation on Perusall & Discussion Questions

Comments on Perusall

To facilitate the understanding of students and interaction between peers, class participants are expected to discuss the required readings in groups before class using the online text annotation tool *Perusall*. Think about it as an online forum, where you discuss the required readings. This should allow us to benefit from the understanding of more than 40 unique minds. For more information about Perusall, watch some YouTube videos (e.g. *Get started with Perusall*) and check the "live demo".

In particular, students are required to write AT LEAST 4 comments on the chapters from Powner (2015) and the scientific articles every week by Thursday 21h00. It is possible to write more than

4 comments. From the total submitted comments, at least 2 should be questions and at least 2 should provide a comment to a question/comment posted by your peers or me. Late comments will be penalized with lower grades (see grading information below). Every reading which needs to be annotated will have at least 2 questions posted by me. Sometimes I will also place comments in your discussions, but the primary purpose of Perusall is that class participants help each other understand the required readings. We will cover the remaining questions or confusions together in class.

Discussion Questions

In addition to the text annotations, class participants are expected to generate at least ONE question suitable for discussion and submit it every week by Friday 11h00 on Moodle. The question(s) should be based on your reading of all required chapters from Powner (2015) and all scientific articles. If you wish you can ask an additional question on the chapters from Caramani (2017), but this is not a requirement and will not be counted towards your grade.

The purpose of this assignment is to facilitate participation in class discussions, as well as to provide me with some information which aspects are unclear and I should cover more thoroughly during class. Note that the deadline for this assignment is after the deadline for the discussion on Perusall. This is on purpose. The idea is that you first participate in the online discussion of the text. The discussions will most probably provide some answers to your questions. After reading the discussions think about at least one question you would like to get an answer to in class and upload it on Moodle. Note that we will not be able to cover all submitted questions during class, but I will try my best to incorporate as many as possible into the class discussions. You are always welcome to ask questions in class. Every student will be able to see all submitted questions before class on Moodle (I will try to upload all questions by 13h00 every Friday). Guidelines and a template for discussion questions will be provided on Moodle.

Open Book Exam

All students have to participate in the open book exam, which will take place in the penultimate class session - 22 June 2018, 15:00-16:30. Students are allowed to bring their printouts of the literature covered in the exam and their own cheat sheets with answers they prepared for the revealed substantive questions.

The exam will include some multiple choice questions (constitute 10-20% of the grade), but will primarily feature substantive questions on the required readings (constitute 80-90% of the grade). I will communicate all potential substantive exam questions for each required reading before class. You can work on your answer ahead of time and prepare a cheat sheet. You will be allowed to bring and use your cheat sheets during the exam (for more information see below). You can number your answers on the cheat sheet and refer to them in your exam. This will save you time hand-writing your answer.

Note that you can use only YOUR cheat sheet, no copies of cheat sheets by others. You have to upload your cheat sheet on Moodle before the exam and submit the cheat sheet you used during the exam together with the exam. Students who have identical cheat sheets will get lower grading, depending on the magnitude of the overlap. It will not matter who has copied from whom, all students with overlapping cheat sheets will receive lower grading. The general rule is, do not share your cheat sheet and do not use cheat sheets by others.

Term Paper

Students are expected to write **an empirical research paper (3000-4000 words)** and **submit their progress** in stages throughout the seminar with strict deadlines in April (research topic), May (research question, initial theory and literature search), and July (first draft).

I will upload all submitted research questions on Moodle so that class participants can read and discuss them in two class sessions. In this way, students are expected to learn how to provide constructive feedback, train their critical thinking, and facilitate collaborative work.

To encourage and practice collaborative work, **students are allowed to team up and write a term paper in groups of up to maximum 2 people**. You decide whether you would like to write your term paper on your own or collaborate with another student of your choice from the class. If you decide to collaborate with another student, you will need to register your co-author as early as possible, but at the latest by Friday, 1 June 2018, 21h00 via Moodle. If your collaboration does not work well, you can still submit a term paper on your own. Note that you can NOT decide to collaborate with another student after the set deadline (01.06.2018 21h00). Collaborative term papers which were not registered with me until the set deadline will not be accepted. The requirements (structure, length etc.) for the term paper are the same no matter whether you write it on your own or in collaboration with another student. Both students who wrote the term paper together will receive the same grade for the term paper.

Additionally, every student has to write **constructive feedback on the first draft of two term papers from their peers** and deliver these in July (Friday, 13 July 2018, 21h00). Ideally, student reviewers will receive two papers for review on a related research topic as their own draft paper. Students can use their peers' feedback to improve their term papers. Additionally, students can arrange a meeting with me via e-mail to discuss their draft papers. Those, who will not be in Vienna but still want to talk to me about their papers, can arrange a Skype session. **The final deadline for the research paper is Tuesday, 31 July 2018, 21h00.**

Recommended Readings

Besides the required reading, the syllabus lists recommended readings. These are *not required to pass the class and will NOT be covered in the discussions, weekly assignments, and the exam*. The recommended readings should give a starting point for the term paper and provide some basis for the interested reader after the class ends.

Further Information and Grading of Each Component

- **1) Attendance, class discussions, weekly assignments (30%):** class attendance, required literature, comments on Perusall, discussion questions, participation in class discussions
 - Students are expected to attend all class sessions. **You are allowed to miss up to two classes during the semester.**
 - Students are expected to read the required literature each week and participate in class discussions.

- To facilitate class discussions you should place 4 comments (at least 2 questions) on Perusall and generate at least one question suitable for class discussion. Place your comments on Perusall by every Thursday 21h00. Insert your discussion questions in an excel sheet (use template) and upload it on Moodle by every Friday 11h00 (no exceptions). I will upload all discussion questions on Moodle before the session.

- **Detailed grading:**
 - * I will grade each class session separately. The overall grade for the attendance, class discussions, and weakly assignments component will be the average of all sessions.
 - * The grades for each session start with a 4.0 (mere class attendance)
 - * On time submission of at least 1 question suitable for class discussion increases the *grade* with 1 point. Late submissions or no submission of discussion questions adds nothing to the grade.
 - * 4 comments (at least 2 questions) on Perusall, submitted on time, increase the *grade* with 1.5 points. Late submissions add 0.5 points to the grade, no submissions add nothing to the grade.
 - * Participation in class discussions (verified with a signature in a discussion list after the class) increases the *grade* with 1 point
 - * Best possible grade - 0.5 (instead of 1.0)

- **2) Exam (30%):** open book in-class exam
 - **Covered Literature**

The exam will include questions on Powner (2015) (Chapter 1,2,3,4) and 8 scientific articles covered until week 14 (1) Tsebelis (1999), 2) Chang and Golden (2007), 3) Tavits (2008), 4) Kedar (2005), 5) McCubbins and Schwartz (1984), 6) Thies (2001), 7) Martin and Vanberg (2014), 8) Hix (2002). The exam will NOT cover chapters from Caramani (2017) and Carrubba et al. (2008) from week 15. You can bring YOUR printouts of this literature and use it during the exam. It is allowed to have hand-written annotations on your printouts, but only on the pages with text. Note that you are allowed to use only your printouts and students are not allowed to share any documents or information during the exam. If a student attempts to share a document or verbal information with another student, both will get a 5.0 on the exam. Every student will have the courtesy of one warning.

 - **Questions**

The exam will include substantive questions on the required readings (constitute 80-90% of the grade) and multiple choice questions (constitute 10-20% of the grade) with bonus questions for extra points. I will communicate all possible substantive questions before each class session so that you can prepare your answer when you work on the required readings. The exam will cover all texts, but due to time constraints, will include only a randomly selected sample of the communicated questions. Each question will have an equal chance of being asked on the exam. Basically, I will draw a random sample from the pool of questions I communicated to you. I will NOT reveal the multiple choice questions ahead of time. There will be also bonus questions, which can give you additional points if you decide to answer them. I will NOT reveal the bonus questions ahead

of time.

– **Cheat Sheet**

You can prepare and bring a cheat sheet with answers to the communicated questions. Your cheat sheet can include no more than 8 pages typed text (A4). The text on your cheat sheet should be typed (minimum size 11, Times New Roman, single-spaced) and have normal margins (1,1,1,1). Include page numbering and number the questions. Instead of writing up the answer you can choose to simply refer to the answer in your cheat sheet if you wish so (this will save you a lot of time). You will have to upload your cheat sheet on Moodle before the exam, at the latest by Friday 22 June 2018, 15h00. In addition, you will have to submit your cheat sheet with the exam. During the exam I will control whether your cheat sheet complies with the requirements (e.g. length). The cheat sheet you uploaded on Moodle and the cheat sheet you used during the exam should be identical.

You can use only YOUR cheat sheet. You can NOT use copies of cheat sheets prepared by others. Students who have identical cheat sheets will get considerably lower grading, depending on the magnitude of the overlap (for example, for 90-100% overlap - 5.0). It will not matter who has copied from whom. All students with overlapping cheat sheets will receive lower grades.

To avoid identical cheat sheets do not share your cheat sheets with others and do not use (even with slight modifications) cheat sheets by others. In general, if you prepare your cheat sheet on your own and use your own words (avoid copy-pasting discussions from Perusall or your peers' written work), you will have very different cheat sheets. Even when you convey the same idea, the written text (sentence structure, language, sentence sequence) will not be identical. I will compare only the text structure and not the ideas. It is clear that the answer to the questions will be very similar. You are encouraged to work in groups when you prepare the answers to the exam questions, as in such a way you can get different perspectives. After the discussions in your working group, write up the ideas using your own words.

Note that the questions will not be purely knowledge questions and you will need time to provide a proper detailed answer to them. This means that without a well-structured cheat sheet it will be fairly difficult to answer the question on the spot.

– **Preparation**

The best way to prepare for the exam is to write your answer to the exam questions for a particular text before class and finalize your answer on your cheat sheet after the class. Note that I will communicate up to 80-90 % of all potential exam questions.

– **Purpose**

The purpose of the exam is that you engage with the required readings more thoroughly and think about some important central aspects. Further by preparing your cheat sheets you will practice succinct writing. I do not expect from you to memorize the answers. This is why you have the cheat sheet.

– **Component grading: general information**

- * Each question in the exam will give you a particular number of points, whereby the total number of points will be 100 (plus some bonus points from the bonus questions). To pass the exam with 4.0, you will need at least 51 points.

- **Term Paper (40%):** 3000-4000 words due Tuesday 31 July 2018 21h00

Students are expected to write an empirical research paper with a length between 3000 and 4000 words. The research paper should identify a puzzle and pose a research question embedded in the scientific literature, develop theoretical expectations (testable hypotheses) and propose a research design to test the theoretical expectations (detailed instructions on Moodle). Class participants are NOT required to gather data and analyze it. In essence, the term paper should include a title page, an abstract, an introduction, literature review, theory, a research design section, conclusions, and references, and is practically a half of a standard scientific article.

Students have to work on their term paper throughout the whole semester and deliver their written progress on the set deadlines (no exceptions, on time submissions increase the section grade, delayed submissions will be penalized with lower grades).

- *Week 4: Research Topic (one sentence) due Friday 13.04.2018 13h00 via Moodle:*

Students are expected to choose their research topic from one of the weekly substantive topics (e.g. Electoral Systems from week 5) on Moodle. Your research topic should fit within the general framework - comparative politics. I do NOT recommend to choose topics not listed in this syllabus. In case of doubt about your research topic and research question, please, discuss it with me.

To choose a topic, read the titles of the required and recommended literature in each section. If something interesting catches your mind, you can read the abstract of some articles that intrigued you. After doing this, you should be able to say which topic appeals to you the most.

The purpose is that you check out some literature and prime your mind to think into a certain direction early on.

- *Week 8: Research Question & Initial Theory (500-600 words) due Tuesday 08.05.2018 21h00 via Moodle:*

Students are encouraged to start working actively on their empirical paper in April (after the introductory sessions into scientific writing). They can start reading the required and recommended literature from a selected week and derive their research question from the literature. This is the hardest part of writing a research paper. Take your time, search for further literature, and read different articles related to your topic.

Students are required to submit a one-page summary of their research question and the literature leading to it, plus some initial thoughts on their theory via Moodle. **Research questions submitted on time give a bonus to the final grade of your term paper, late or no submissions are penalized with lower grading.** In particular, on time submission of your research question increases the *grade* of the term paper by 0.3, late or no submission of the research question lowers the *grade* of the term paper with 0.3.

I will NOT grade research questions. Their purpose is that you start working on your term papers early on.

- *Week 9: Literature Search & - due Tuesday 15.05.2018 21h00 via Moodle:*

Students have to search for scientific literature on a given topic and create a list with at least 20 scientific works (preferably journal articles). The literature list should follow the APSA reference style (see guidelines on Moodle). The topics will correspond to the submitted research questions. Note that you can receive a topic different from your own research question.

All literature lists will be appended and uploaded on Moodle so that everybody can benefit. The purpose is to practice how you search for scientific literature, apply the APSA reference style, as well as create a literature list which will be of benefit to you and your peers. **Literature lists submitted on time give a bonus to the final grade of your term paper, late or no submissions are penalized with lower grading.** In particular, on time submission of your literature list increases the *grade* of the term paper by up to 0.3, late or no submission of the literature list lowers the *grade* of the term paper with 0.3. I will evaluate whether your literature lists comply with the APSA reference style.

- *First draft (min 1500 words) - due Friday 06 July 2018 21h00 via Moodle:*

Students are encouraged to work actively on their empirical paper and complete their first draft in May and June. Students should submit the first draft of their term paper by Friday 06 July 2018 21h00 on Moodle. **Draft papers submitted on time give a bonus to the final grade of your term paper, late or no submissions are penalized with lower grades.** In particular, on time submission of your draft paper increases the *grade* of the term paper by 0.3, late or no submission of the draft paper lowers the *grade* of the term paper with 0.3.

I will NOT grade your draft papers. Their purpose is that you work on your term paper early on.

- *Feedback on two draft papers - due Friday 13 July 2018 21h00*

Every class participant will receive **two draft papers** and will have to write a constructive review to each of the two draft papers. I will upload review guidelines on Moodle. Students will have approximately 7 days for their reviews and have to submit their written feedback on the two draft papers until Friday 13 July 2018 21h00. **Peer feedback on two draft papers can provide up to 0.6 bonus (0.3 for each reviewed draft paper) to the final grade of the term paper.** On time submissions increase the bonus, late or no submissions decrease the bonus (for more information see below).

Students will evaluate the peer feedback on their draft paper and can choose among 4 options: "not helpful", "no constructive feedback", "helpful constructive feedback", "very helpful constructive feedback". The evaluation of the peer feedback influences the overall bonus.

- *Final Deadline: 31 July 2018 21h00 via Moodle:*

The final deadline for the term paper is 31 July 2018 21h00. There will be no exceptions for the submission deadline. I will penalize delayed submissions with lower grades - 0.5 points for every delayed 6 hours. I will NOT accept papers 48 hours after the deadline. Students who submitted their term paper too late (with more than 48 hours delay) or did not submit their term papers, can NOT pass the class, even if their overall grade is better than 4.0. If students want to receive their final grade before the end of July 2018, they will need to submit their term paper at the latest by Tuesday 17 July 2018 21h00 on Moodle.

- **Detailed grading of term papers + bonuses/penalties:**

- * Possible grades for the term paper range between 5.0 (fail) and 1.0 (excellent)
- * Every 6 hours delay for the submission of the term paper decreases the grade of the term paper with 0.5 points. Note that I will NOT accept term papers 48 hours after the deadline.

Grade bonuses/grade penalties

- * Research question with initial theory: the grade of the term paper increases (decreases) with 0.3 grade points if you have submitted your research question with initial theory on time (late).
- * Literature list: the grade of the term paper increases (decreases) with up to 0.3 grade points if you have submitted your literature list on time (late). The bonus can be less than 0.3 points if your literature list does not comply with the APSA reference style and includes less than 20 scientific works.
- * Draft paper: the grade of the term paper increases (decreases) with 0.3 grade points if you have submitted your draft paper on time (late).
- * Peer feedback: the grade of the term paper increases (decreases) with up to 0.6 grade points if you have submitted your peer feedback on 2 draft papers on time (late).

Additional Information:

- On time submission of a feedback to **one** draft paper adds 0.1, late submissions add nothing to the grade.
- Students will indicate whether the review they received was a) not helpful (- 0.1 grade points), b) descriptive (0 bonus), 3) helpful (+ 0.1 bonus), 4) very helpful (+0.2 bonus). Not helpful feedback decreases the bonus with 0.1 points. For feedback, which consists of a mere description what was done good and bad, without any constructive suggestions, there is no additional bonus. Helpful feedback (with constructive suggestions) increases the bonus with 0.1 points. Very helpful feedback (many useful suggestions for improvement) increases the grade with 0.2 points.
- This means that each of your reviews submitted on time and evaluated as "very helpful" will increase the grade of your term paper by 0.3 grade points. Two such reviews will increase the grade of your term paper with 0.6 grade points. For example, if your term paper receives a grade 1.6, then a 0.6 bonus from your peer feedback means that the final grade of your term paper will be 1.0. Similar logic

applies to the bonuses you will receive from submitting your research question, literature list, and draft papers on time. In total, you can get up to 1.5 grade bonus on your term papers. This means that, if your term paper is graded as 2.5 and you have earned a bonus of 1.5 grade points, the final grade for your term paper will be 1.0.

- *Brainstorming and discussions in groups are allowed, but own writing is required:*

You are encouraged to meet with your peers and discuss in groups your further readings and your understanding of them. Group discussions outside of the class are encouraged - they facilitate brainstorming, understanding, and creativity. If you find an interesting article, do share it with your peers. Note that all written assignments should be written by yourself and can not be a copy or a transformed version of your peers' work. Students may not give or get any unauthorized or excessive assistance in the preparation of any of the written assignments (ghostwriting).

Students are allowed, but not encouraged to investigate a similar research question or the same research question. In case that students decide to investigate a similar or the same research question, they should derive the research question from the literature on their own way and propose their own theoretical arguments and own research design to test their hypotheses. If students do not copy from each others' written work, their papers will be completely different even if they address the same topic and investigate the same research question. In other words, feel free to share your ideas with others, you will not be penalized if your peers decide to investigate the same idea. To avoid any complications do not take your peers ideas one to one, you can build on them. In any case, do not write your paper on the basis of your peers' written work. Papers which investigate identical research questions AND have a similar structure of the argument and writing will be treated as plagiarism and will not be accepted.

You are welcome to visit me during my office hours if you have concrete questions on certain papers you have already read. Please notify me in advance, so that I can look at the paper too.

Technical Instructions:

Note that some of the required articles might change, in case I find a better suiting article (more interesting) for the class discussion. I will inform you of any changes in the syllabus in advance.

All supplementary material for the class including various templates and guidelines will be available via Moodle. Students should submit all their written work on Moodle. All research questions and draft term papers should be uploaded on Moodle. Students will be able to read these, which should facilitate the learning process and creativity.

Academic Honesty Policy Summary:

In addition to skills and knowledge, University of Vienna aims to teach students appropriate Ethical and Professional Standards of Conduct. The Academic Honesty Policy exists to inform students and Faculty of their obligations in upholding the highest standards of professional and ethical integrity. All student work is subject to the Academic Honesty Policy. Professional and Academic practice provides guidance about how to properly cite, reference, and attribute the intellectual property of others. Any attempt to deceive a faculty member or to help another student to do so will be considered a violation of this standard. In other words, plagiarism and ghostwriting are strictly forbidden. To make sure that these rules are not violated on some occasions students will be required to provide an oral discussion of their written work.

Authorship

Student must clearly establish authorship of their work. Referenced work must be clearly documented, cited, and attributed, regardless of media or distribution.

Declaration

Online submission of, or placing one's name on an assignment, or any course document is a statement of academic honor that the student has not received or given inappropriate assistance in completing it and that the student has complied with the *Academic Honesty Policy* in that work.

Consequences

The instructor may impose a sanction on the student that varies depending upon the nature and gravity of the offense. Instances of ghostwriting and plagiarism will be instantly communicated to the University administration, which will make the final decision on the case. Possible sanctions include but are not limited to, the following: (1) Require the student to redo the assignment; (2) Require the student to complete another assignment; (3) Assign a grade 5 (fail) to the assignment; (4) Assign a final grade of 5 (fail) for the course; (6) Write an X (Plagiat) in the final bachelor/master certificate of the student. A student may appeal these decisions according to the Academic Grievance Procedure. (See the relevant section *here*)

Detailed Readings Plan:

Week 1 (09.03): Introduction & plan

No readings

Recommended: Learning strategies

Oakley, B. (2014) *A mind for Number: How to Excel at Math and Science (Even if You Flunked Algebra)*, New York: Penguin.

Week 2 (16.03): Empirical Research I: Research Question & Hypotheses

Powner, L. (2015) From Research Topic to Research Question, in L. Powner (Ed.) *Empirical Research and Writing. A Political Science Student's Practical Guide*, Los Angeles: CQ Press, pp. 1-19. (Chapter 1)

Powner, L. (2015) From Research Question to Theory to Hypothesis, in L. Powner (Ed.) *Empirical Research and Writing. A Political Science Student's Practical Guide*, Los Angeles: CQ Press, pp. 21-54. (Chapter 2)

Week 3 (23.03): Empirical Research I: Literature Review & Research Design

Powner, L. (2015) Doing Pre-Research, in L. Powner (Eds) *Empirical Research and Writing. A Political Science Student's Practical Guide*, Los Angeles: CQ Press, pp. 55-80. (Chapter 3)

Powner, L. (2015) Choosing a Design That Fits Your Question, in L. Powner (Ed.) *Empirical Research and Writing. A Political Science Student's Practical Guide*, Los Angeles: CQ Press, pp. 81-108. (Chapter 4)

Recommended:

Research Design and Writing:

Geddes, B. (2003) *Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory building and research design in comparative politics*, Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press.

*King, G., R. Keohane, S. Verba (1994) *Designing Social Enquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

*Powner, L. (2015) *Empirical Research and Writing. A Political Science Student's Practical Guide*, Los Angeles: CQ Press. (remaining chapters from 5- to 11 on qualitative and quantitative research, writing up your research, practicing peer review and preparing presentation and publishing)

Gschwend, T. and F. Schimmelfennig (2007) *Research Design in Political Science. How to Practice*

what they Preach, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Case Selection

Mahoney, J., and G. Goertz (2004) The Possibility Principle, *The American Political Science Review*, 98(4): 653-669.

Seawright, J. and J. Gerring (2008) Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research, *Political Research Quarterly* 61(2): 294-308.

Quantitative and Qualitative Research:

Abadie, A., A. Diamond, J. Hainmueller (2015) Comparative Politics and the Synthetic Control Method, *American Journal of Political Science*, 59(2): 495-510.

Collier, D (2011) The comparative method, in A. W. Finifter (Ed.) *Political Science: The State of the Discipline*. Washington DC: APSA.

Gerring, J. (2004) What Is a Case Study and What is It Good For?, *The American Political Science Review*, 98(2): 341-354.

Gerring, J. and R. McDermott (2007) An Experimental Template for Case Study Research, *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(3): 688-701.

Lieberman, E. (2005) Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research, *The American Political Science Review*, 99(3): 435-452.

Sekhon, J. (2004) Quality Meets Quantity: Case Studies, Conditional Probability and Counterfactuals, *Perspectives on Politics*, 2(2): 281-293.

Publications:

King, G. (2006) Publication, Publication, PS, *Political Science and Politics* 39: 119-125.

Writing Style:

*Sylvia, P. (2007) *How to Write a Lot: A Practical Guide To Productive Academic Writing*, Washington DC: APA.

*Strunk, W. and E. White (2000) *The Elements of Style*, 4th Edition, Massachusetts: Pearson.

26.03-08.04.2018 - Spring Holidays

Week 4 (13.04): Comparative Politics: Overview

Caramani, D. (2017) Introduction to Comparative Politics, in D. Caramani (Ed.), *Comparative Politics*, 4th Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1-17. (Chapter 1)

Tsebelis, T. (1999) Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis, *The American Political Science Review*, 93(3): 591-608.

Recommended:

Veto Player Theory - Foundational Work

- Tsebelis, G. (1995) Decision making in political systems: Veto players in presidentialism, parliamentarism, multicameralism and multipartyism, *British journal of political science*, 25(3): 289-325.
- Tsebelis, T. (1999) Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis, *The American Political Science Review*, 93(3): 591-608.
- Tsebelis, G. (2002) *Veto players: How political institutions work*, Princeton University Press.
- Tsebelis, G. and Money, J. (1997) *Bicameralism*. Cambridge University Press.
- Tsebelis, G. and Chang, E. (2004) Veto players and the structure of budgets in advanced industrialized countries, *European Journal of Political Research* 43(3): 449-476.

Applications/Extensions of the Theory:

- König, T., Tsebelis, G. and Debus, M. (Eds) (2010) *Reform processes and policy change: veto players and decision-making in modern democracies* (Vol. 16), Springer Science and Business Media.
- West, K. and Lee, H. (2014) Veto players revisited: Internal and external factors influencing policy production, *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 39(2): 227-260.

Veto Players and Cabinet Formation

- Eppner, S. and Ganghof, S. (2017) Institutional veto players and cabinet formation: The veto control hypothesis reconsidered, *European Journal of Political Research*, 56(1): 169-186.
- Tsebelis, G. and Ha, E. (2014) Coalition theory: a veto players? approach, *European Political Science Review*, 6(3): 331-357. (Veto players and Cabinet Formation)

Veto Players and Discretion of Central Banks

- Bernhard, W. (1998) A political explanation of variations in central bank independence, *American Political Science Review* 92(2): 311-327.
- Bodea, C. and Hicks, R. (2015) Price stability and central bank independence: Discipline, credibility, and democratic institutions, *International Organization*, 69(1): 35-61.
- Keefer, P. and Stasavage, D. (2003) The limits of delegation: Veto players, central bank independence, and the credibility of monetary policy, *American political science review*, 97(3): 407-423.

Veto Players and Referendums, Voter Turnout, Bureaucratic Corruption, Human Rights, Investments

- Bagashka, T. (2014) Unpacking corruption: The effect of veto players on state capture and bureaucratic corruption, *Political Research Quarterly*, 67(1): 165-180.
- Carlin, R. and Love, G. (2013) What's at stake? A veto-player theory of voter turnout, *Electoral Studies*, 32(4): 807-818.
- Hug, S. and Tsebelis, G. (2002) Veto players and referendums around the world, *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 14(4): 465-515.
- Justesen, M. (2014) Better safe than sorry: How property rights and veto players jointly affect economic growth, *Comparative Politics*, 46(2): 147-167.
- Lupu, Y. (2015) Legislative veto players and the effects of international human rights agreements, *American Journal of Political Science* 59(3): 578-594.
- MacIntyre, A. (2001) Institutions and investors: The politics of the economic crisis in South-east Asia, *International Organization*, 55(1): 81-122.

Week 5 (20.04): Electoral Systems

Gallagher, M. (2017) Elections and Referendums, in D. Caramani (Ed.), *Comparative Politics*, 4th Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 173-187. (Chapter 10)

Chang, E., and M. Golden (2007) Electoral systems, district magnitude and corruption, *British Journal of Political Science*, 37(01): 115-137.

Recommended:

Overview Articles

Benoit, K. (2007) Electoral Laws as Political Consequences: Explaining the Origins and Change of Electoral Institutions, *Annual Review of Political Science* 10: 363-90.

Bormann, N. and M. Golder (2013) Democratic electoral systems around the world, 1946-2011, *Electoral Studies*, 32(2): 360-369.

Golder, M. (2005) Democratic electoral systems around the world, 1946-2000, *Electoral Studies*, 24(1), 103-121.

Grofman, B. (2016) Perspectives on the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, *Annual Review of Political Science*, 19, 523-540.

Electoral Systems and their Origins

Benoit, K. (2000) Which electoral formula is the most proportional? A new look with new evidence, *Political Analysis*, 381-388.

Boix, C. (1999) Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies, *American Political Science Review*, 93 (3): 609-624.

Carey, J., and S. Hix (2011) The Electoral Sweet Spot: Low-Magnitude Proportional Electoral Systems., *American Journal of Political Science*, 55(2): 383-397.

Christensen, R., and P. Johnson (1995) Toward a context-rich analysis of electoral systems: the Japanese example, *American Journal of Political Science*, 39(3): 575-598.

Colomer, J. (2005) It's parties that choose electoral systems (or, Duverger's laws upside down), *Political studies*, 53(1): 1-21.

Cox, G. (1997) Making Votes Count: strategic coordination in the world's electoral systems, Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

Cusack, T., T. Iversen, and D. Soskice (2007) Economic interests and the origins of electoral systems, *American Political Science Review* 101(03): 373-391.

Gallagher, M. (1991) Proportionality, disproportionality and electoral systems, *Electoral studies*, 10(1), 33-51.

Katz, R. (1980) A Theory of Party and Electoral Systems, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP.

Mainwaring, S. (1991) Politicians, Parties, and Electoral Systems. Brazil in Comparative Perspective, *Comparative Politics*, 24(1): 21-43.

Shugart, M., and M. Wattenberg (2001) Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds?, New York: Oxford University Press.

Taagepera, R., and M. Shugart (1989) Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems, New Haven: Yale University Press.

Consequences of Electoral Rules

Grofman, B., and A. Lijphart (1986) Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences, New York: Agathon Press.

Lijphart, A. (1990) The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, 1945-85, *The American Political Science Review*, 84(2):481-96.

Lijphart, A. (1994) Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-1990, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Monroe, B., and A. Rose, A. (2002) Electoral systems and unimagined consequences: Partisan effects of districted proportional representation, *American Journal of Political Science*, 46(1): 67-89.

Moser, R. (1999) Electoral Systems and the Number of Parties in Postcommunist States, *World Politics*, 51(3): 359-384.

Neto, O. and G. Cox. (1997) Electoral Institutions, Cleavage Structures and the Number of Parties, *American Journal of Political Science*, 41(1): 149-174.

Ordeshook, P., and O. Shvetsova (1994) Ethnic Heterogeneity, District Magnitude, and the Number of Parties, *American Journal of Political Science*, 38(1):100-23.

Riker, W. (1982) The Two-Party System and Duverger's Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science, *American Political Science Review*, 76(4):753-66.

Rokkan, S. (1970) Citizens, Elections, Parties, New York: Mackay.

Shugart, M. (1985) The Two Effects of District Magnitude: Venezuela as a Crucial Experiment, *European Journal of Political Research*, 13(4): 353-64.

Taagepera, R., and M. Shugart (1993) Predicting the Number of Parties: A Quantitative Model of Duverger's Mechanical Effect, *American Political Science Review*, 87(02): 455-464.

Taagepera, R. (1999) The number of parties as a function of heterogeneity and electoral system, *Comparative Political Studies*, 32(5): 531-548.

Taagepera, R. (2007) Predicting Party Sizes: The Logic of Simple Electoral Systems, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Taagepera, R., and B. Grofman (1985) Rethinking Duverger's Law: Predicting the Effective Number of Parties in Plurality and PR Systems-Parties Minus Issues Equals One, *European Journal of Political Research*, 13(4): 341-52.

Electoral Systems, Policies and Political Representation

Bernauer, J., N. Giger and J. Rosset (2015) Mind the gap: Do proportional electoral systems foster a more equal representation of women and men, poor and rich?, *International Political Science Review*, 36(1), 78-98.

Carter, E. (2004) Does PR Promote Political Extremism? Evidence from the West European Parties of the Extreme Right, *Representation*, 40(2): 82-100.

Cox, G. (1990) Centripetal and centrifugal incentives in electoral systems, *American Journal of Political Science*, 34(4): 903-935.

Jurado, I., and S. Leon (2017) Geography matters: The conditional effect of electoral systems on social spending, *British Journal of Political Science*, 1-23. (first published online)

Rogowski, R., and M. Kayser (2002) Majoritarian electoral systems and consumer power: price-level evidence from the OECD countries, *American Journal of Political Science*, 46(3): 526-539.

Sieberer, U. (2010) Behavioral consequences of mixed electoral systems: Deviating voting behavior of district and list MPs in the German Bundestag, *Electoral Studies*, 29(3): 484-496.

(Strategic) Voting and Voter Participation

Bargsted, M., and O. Kedar (2009) Coalition-targeted Duvergerian voting: how expectations affect voter choice under proportional representation, *American Journal of Political Science*, 53(2): 307-323.

Karp, J., and S. Banducci (2008) Political efficacy and participation in twenty-seven democracies: How electoral systems shape political behaviour, *British Journal of Political Science*, 38(2): 311-334.

Lijphart, A. (1997) Unequal participation: Democracy's unresolved dilemma presidential address, *The American Political Science Review*, 91(01): 1-14. (Compulsory voting)

Norris, P. (2004) *Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Week 6 (27.04) Parties and Party Systems

Katz, R. (2017) Political Parties, in D. Caramani (Ed.), *Comparative Politics*, 4th Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 207-223. (Chapter 12)

Caramani, D. (2017) Party Systems, in D. Caramani (Ed.), *Comparative Politics*, 4th Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 224-244. (Chapter 13)

Tavits, M. (2008) Party systems in the making: The emergence and success of new parties in new democracies, *British Journal of Political Science*, 38(01): 113-133.

Recommended:

Origins of Parties:

Aldrich, J. H. (1995) *Why parties?: The origin and transformation of political parties in America*. University of Chicago Press.

Boix, C. (2007) The emergence of parties and party systems, In *The Oxford handbook of comparative politics*.

Bolleyer, N., and E. Bytzek (2013) Origins of party formation and new party success in advanced democracies, *European Journal of Political Research*, 52(6): 773-796.

Downs, A. (1957) *Economic Theory of Democracy*, New York: Harper and Brothers

Gunther, R. (1989) Electoral laws, party systems, and elites: the case of Spain, *American Political Science Review*, 83(3): 835-858.

Gunther, R., J. Montero, and J. Linz (Eds.) (2002) Political parties: Old concepts and new challenges, Chicago: OUP Oxford .

Laver, M. and K. Benoit (2003) The evolution of party systems between elections, *American Journal of Political Science*, 47(2): 215-233.

Lijphart, A. (1990) The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, 1945-85, *The American Political Science Review*, 84(2):481-96.

Neto, O. and G. Cox. (1997) Electoral Institutions, Cleavage Structures and the Number of Parties, *American Journal of Political Science*, 41(1): 149-174.

Ordeshook, P., and O. Shvetsova (1994) Ethnic Heterogeneity, District Magnitude, and the Number of Parties, *American Journal of Political Science*, 38(1):100-23.

Riker, W. (1982) The two-party system and Duverger's law: an essay on the history of political science, *American Political Science Review*, 76(04): 753-766.

Stokes, S. (1999) Political Parties and Democracy, *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2: 243-267.

Cleavages and Party Systems

Chhibber, P. and J. Petrocik (1989) The Puzzle of Indian Politics: Social Cleavages and the Indian Party System, *British Journal of Political Science*, 19: 191-210.

Chhibber, P. and M. Torcal (1997) Elite Strategy, Social Cleavages, and Party Systems in New Democracies: Spain, *Comparative Political Studies*, 30(1): 27-54.

Kitschelt, H. (1992) The Formation of Party Systems in East Central Europe, *Politics and Society*, 20(1): 7-50.

Lijphart, A. (1999) Patterns of Democracy, New Haven: Yale University Press. (Chapter 5)

Mair, P. (1990) The West European Party System, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Zielinski, J. (2002) Translating Social Cleavages into Party Systems: The Significance of New Democracies, *World Politics*, 54: 184-211.

Partisan Policy:

Blais, A., D. Blake, and S. Dion (1993). Do parties make a difference? Parties and the size of government in liberal democracies, *American Journal of Political Science*, 37(1): 40-62.

Hibbs, D. A. (1977) Political parties and macroeconomic policy, *American Political Science Review*, 71(04): 1467-1487.

Imbeau, L., P. Francois, and M. Lamari (2001) Left-Right Ideology and Government Policies: A Meta-Analysis, *European Journal of Political Research*, 40(1): 1-29.

Kedar, O. (2009) Voting for policy, not parties: How voters compensate for power sharing, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press."

King, G., M. Laver, R. Hofferbert, I. Budge, and M. McDonald (1993) Party Platforms, Mandates, and Government Spending, *American Political Science Review*, 87(3): 744-750.

Letki, N. and M. Tavits (2009) When Left Is Right: Party Ideology and Policy in Post-Communist Europe, *American Political Science Review*, 103(4): 555-569.

Thomson, R. (2001) The Programme to Policy Linkage: The Fulfilment of Election Pledges on Socio-Economic Policy in the Netherlands, 1986-1998, *European Journal of Political Research*, 40(2): 171-197.

Party Unity and Switching:

Carey, J. (2007) Political Institutions, Competing Principals, and Party Unity in Legislative Voting, *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(1): 92-107.

Desposato, S. (2006) Parties for Rent? Ambition, Ideology, and Party Switching in Brazil's Chamber of Deputies, *American Journal of Political Science*, 50(1): 62-80.

Heller, W. and C. Mershon (2008) Dealing with Discipline: Party Switching and Legislative Voting in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, 1988-2000, *American Journal of Political Science*, 52(4): 910-925.

Mershon, C. and O. Shvetsova (2008) Parliamentary Cycles and Party Switching in Legislatures, *Comparative Political Studies*, 41(1): 99-127.

Niche and extremist parties:

Adams, J., M. Clark, L. Ezrow, and G. Glasgow (2006) Are niche parties fundamentally different from mainstream parties? The causes and the electoral consequences of Western European parties' policy shifts, 1976-1998, *American Journal of Political Science*, 50(3), 513-529.

Carter, E. (2002) Proportional Representation and the Fortunes of the Right-Wing Extremist Parties, *West European Politics*, 25(3): 125-46.

Carter, E. (2004) Does PR Promote Political Extremism? Evidence from the West European Parties of the Extreme Right, *Representation*, 40(2): 82-100.

Ezrow, L. (2008) Parties? Policy Programmes and the Dog that Didn't Bark: No Evidence that Proportional Systems Promote Extreme Party Positioning, *British Journal of Political Science*, 38: 479-497.

Gidengil, E., M. Hinnigar, A. Blais, and N. Nevitte (2005) Explaining the Gender Gap in Support for the New Right. The Case of Canada, *Comparative Political Studies*, 38: 1171-95.

- Givens, T. (2005) The Radical Right Gender Gap, *Comparative Political Studies*, 37: 30-54.
- Golder, M. (2003) Explaining Variation in the Success of Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe, *Comparative Political Studies*, 36(4): 432-466.
- Jackman, R. and K. Volpert (1996) Conditions Favouring Parties of the Extreme Right in Western Europe, *British Journal of Political Science*, 26(4): 501-22.
- Kitschelt, H. (1995) *The Radical Right in Western Europe*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Lubbers, M., M. Gijsberts and P. Scheepers (2002) Extreme Right-Wing Voting in Western Europe, *European Journal of Political Research*, 41: 345-78.
- Meguid, B. (2005) Competition between Unequals: The Role of Mainstream Party Strategy and Niche Party Success, *The American Political Science Review*, 99(3): 347-60.
- Norris, P. (2005) *Radical Right. Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market*, Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
- Rydgren, J. (2005) Is Extreme Right-Wing Populism Contagious? Explaining the Emergence of a New Party Family, *European Journal of Political Research*, 44: 413-37.
- Van der Brug, W., M. Fennema, and J. Tillie (2005) Why Some Anti-Immigrant Parties Fail and Others Succeed. A Two-Step Model of Aggregate Electoral Support, *Comparative Political Studies*, 38: 537-73.

Week 7 (04.05): Voting Behavior

- Kedar, O. (2005) When Moderate Voters Prefer Extreme Parties: Policy Balancing in Parliamentary Elections, *American Political Science Review*, 99(2): 185-200.

Recommended:

- Anderson, C. (2007) The end of economic voting? Contingency dilemmas and the limits of democratic accountability, *Annual Review of Political Science*, 10, 271-296.
- Bargsted, M., and O. Kedar (2009) Coalition-targeted Duvergerian voting: how expectations affect voter choice under proportional representation, *American Journal of Political Science*, 53(2): 307-323.
- Duch, R., and R. Stevenson (2005) Context and the economic vote: a multilevel analysis, *Political Analysis*: 387-409.
- Duch, R., and R. Stevenson (2008) *The economic vote: How political and economic institutions condition election results*, Cambridge University Press.

Gomez, B., and J. Wilson (2001) Political sophistication and economic voting in the American electorate: A theory of heterogeneous attribution, *American Journal of Political Science*, 45(4): 899-914.

Hobolt, S., J. Tilley, and S. Banducci (2013) Clarity of responsibility: How government cohesion conditions performance voting, *European Journal of Political Research*, 52(2): 164-187.

Lewis-Beck, M., R. Nadeau, and A. Elias (2008) Economics, party, and the vote: Causality issues and panel data, *American Journal of Political Science*, 52(1): 84-95.

Powell, G., (2000) *Elections as Instruments of Democracy*, New Haven: Yale UP.

Powell G, and G. Whitten (1993) A cross-national analysis of economic voting: taking account of the political context, *American Journal of Political Science*, 37(2): 391-414.

Week 8 (11.05): Research Question Discussion I

Read research questions by your peers uploaded on Moodle.

Week 9 (18.05): Research Question Discussion II

Read research questions by your peers uploaded on Moodle.

Week 10 (25.05): Legislatures

Kreppel, A. (2017) Legislatures, in D. Caramani (Ed.), *Comparative Politics*, 4th Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 117-135. (Chapter 7)

McCubbins, M. and T. Schwartz (1984) Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms, *American Journal of Political Science*, 28(1): 165-179.

Recommended:

Binder, S. (1999) The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947-96, *The American Political Science Review*, 93(3): 519-533.

Binder, S., E. Lawrence, S. Smith (2002) Tracking the Filibuster, 1917 to 1996, *American Politics Research*, 30(4): 406-422.

Calvert, R., M. McCubbins and B. Weingast (1984) A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion, *American Journal of Political Science*, 33(3): 588-611.

Fortunato, D., T. König, and S.-O. Proksch (2013) Government agenda-setting and bicameral conflict resolution, *Political Research Quarterly*, 66(4): 938-951.

McCubbins, M. (1985) The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure, *American Journal of Political Science*, 29(4): 721-748.

McGann, A. (2004), The Tyranny of the Supermajority. How Majority Rule Protects Minorities, in: *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 16(1): 53-77.

Tsebelis, G. and J. Money (1997) Bicameralism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tsebelis, G. (2002) Veto Players, How Political Institutions Work, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Tsebelis, G. (1995) Decision making in political systems: Veto players in presidentialism, parliamentarism, multicameralism and multipartyism, *British Journal of Political Science*, 25(03): 289-325.

Week 11 (01.06): Government Types

Müller, W. C. (2017) Governments and Bureaucracies, in D. Caramani (Ed.), *Comparative Politics*, 4th Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 136-154. (Chapter 8)

Thies, M. (2001) Keeping Tabs on Partners: The Logic of Delegation in Coalition Governments, *American Journal of Political Science*, 45(3): 580-598.

Recommended:

Laver, M. and N. Schofield (1990) Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Martin, L.. and R. Stevenson (2001) Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies, *American Journal of Political Science*, 45: 33-50.

Volden, C. and C. Carrubba (2004) The Formation of Oversized Coalitions in Parliamentary Democracies, *American Journal of Political Science*, 48: 521-537.

Week 12 (08.06): Legislative Politics in Parliamentary Systems

Martin, L. W., and G. Vanberg (2014) Parties and policymaking in multiparty governments: The legislative median, ministerial autonomy, and the coalition compromise, *American Journal of Political Science*, 58(4): 979-996.

Recommended:

Carroll, R., and G. Cox (2012) Shadowing Ministers Monitoring Partners in Coalition Governments, *Comparative Political Studies*, 45(2), 220-236.

Kim, D., and G. Loewenberg (2005) The Role of Parliamentary Committees in Coalition Governments Keeping Tabs on Coalition Partners in the German Bundestag, *Comparative Political Studies*, 38(9): 1104-1129.

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Week 13 (15.06): Supranational Institutions

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Hix, S. (2002) Parliamentary behavior with two principals: Preferences, parties, and voting in the European Parliament, *American Journal of Political Science*, 46(3): 688-698.

Recommended:

The political system of the EU

Hix, S., (2013) What's Wrong with the Europe Union and How to Fix it, John Wiley & Sons.

Hix, S. and B. Hyland (2011) The political system of the European Union, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Tsebelis, G. and G. Garrett (2001) The institutional foundations of intergovernmentalism and supranationalism in the European Union, *International organization*, 55(02): 357-390.

Power Distribution and Legislation

Boranbay-Akan, S., T. König, and M. Osnabrgge (2016) The imperfect agenda-setter: Why do legislative proposals fail in the EU decision-making process?, *European Union Politics*, 3: 1-20. (first published online)

Crombez, C. and S. Hix (2015) Legislative activity and gridlock in the European Union, *British Journal of Political Science*, 45(03): 477-499.

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Junge, D., T. König, and B. Luig (2015) Legislative gridlock and bureaucratic politics in the European Union, *British journal of political science* 45(04): 777-797.

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Hix, S. (2001) Legislative behaviour and party competition in the European Parliament: An application of nominate to the EU, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 39(4): 663-688.

Hix, S. (2002) Constitutional agenda-setting through discretion in rule interpretation: why the European Parliament won at Amsterdam, *British Journal of Political Science*, 32(02): 259-280.

Hix, S. (2004) Electoral Institutions and Legislative Behavior: Explaining Voting Detection in the European Parliament, *World Politics*, 56(2): 194-223.

Hix, S., A. Noury, and G. Roland (2006) Dimensions of politics in the European Parliament, *American Journal of Political Science*, 50(2): 494-520.

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Tsebelis, G. (1994) The power of the European Parliament as a conditional agenda setter, *American Political Science Review*, 88(01): 128-142.

European Court of Justice

Garrett, G. (1995) The politics of legal integration in the European Union, *International Organization*, 49(01): 171-181.

Stone Sweet, A. and T. Brunell (1998) Constructing a Supranational Constitution: Dispute Resolution and Governance in the European Community, *American Political Science Review* 92(1): 63-80.

Sweet, A. and T. Brunell, (2012) The European Court of Justice, state noncompliance, and the politics of override, *American Political Science Review*, 106(01): 204-213.

Compliance

Angelova, M., T. Dannwolf, and T. König, T. (2012) How robust are compliance findings? A research synthesis, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 19(8):1269-1291.

König, T. and L. Mäder (2014) The strategic nature of compliance: An empirical evaluation of law implementation in the central monitoring system of the European Union, *American Journal of Political Science* 58(1): 246-263.

Mastenbroek, E. (2005) EU compliance: Still a "black hole"?, *Journal of European Public Policy* 12(6): 1103-1120.

EU and Voters

Hobolt, S. and Tilley, J. (2014) Who's in charge? How voters attribute responsibility in the European Union, *Comparative Political Studies*, 47(6): 795-819.

Hix, S. and M. Marsh, M (2007) Punishment or protest? Understanding European parliament elections, *Journal of Politics*, 69(2): 495-510.

Week 14 (22.06) Open Book Exam

Week 15 (29.06) Courts

Stone Sweet, A. (2017) *Constitutions, Rights, and Judicial Power*, in D. Caramani (Ed.), *Comparative Politics*, 4th Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 155-172. (Chapter 9)

Carrubba, C., M. Gabel, and C. Hankla (2008) Judicial behavior under political constraints: Evidence from the European Court of Justice, *American Political Science Review*, 102(04): 435-452.

Recommended:

Judges and Constitutional Politics

Shapiro, M., and A. Stone Sweet (1994) Special Issue: The New Constitutional Politics of Europe, *Comparative Political Studies*, 26(4): 397-420.

Stone Sweet, A. (2000) *Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Legitimacy and Public Support

Caldeira, G. (1986) Neither the purse nor the sword: Dynamics of public confidence in the Supreme Court, *American Political Science Review*, 80(4): 1209-1226.

Clark, T. (2009) The separation of powers, court curbing, and judicial legitimacy, *American Journal of Political Science*, 53(4): 971-989.

Krehbiel, J. (2016) The politics of judicial procedures: The role of public oral hearings in the German constitutional court, *American Journal of Political Science*, 60(4): 990-1005.

McGuire, K., and J. Stimson (2004) The Least Dangerous Branch Revisited: New Evidence on Supreme Court Responsiveness to Public Preference, *Journal of Politics*, 66(4): 1018-1035.

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Gibson, J.L., G. Caldeira, and V. Baird (1998) On the legitimacy of national high courts, *American Political Science Review*, 92(2): 343-358.

Judicial Decision-Making and Legislation

McGuire, K. and G. Caldeira (1993) Lawyers, Organized Interests, and the Law of Obscenity: Agenda Setting in the Supreme Court, *American Political Science Review*, 87(03), 717-726.

Rogers, J. (2001) Information and judicial review: A signaling game of legislative-judicial interaction, *American Journal of Political Science*, 45(1): 84-99.

Rogers, J., and G. Vanberg (2002) Judicial Advisory Opinions and Legislative Outcomes in Comparative Perspective, *American Journal of Political Science* 46(2): 379-397.

Shapiro, M. (1964) Law and Politics in the Supreme Court: New approaches to political jurisprudence, New York: Free Press of Glencoe.

Segal, J.A. (1997) Separation-of-powers games in the positive theory of congress and courts, *American Political Science Review*, 91(01): 28-44.

Vanberg, G. (1998) Abstract Judicial Review, Legislative Bargaining, and Policy Compromise, *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 10(3): 299-326.

Vanberg, G. (2000) Establishing Judicial Independence in West Germany: The Impact of Opinion Leadership and the Separation of Powers, *Comparative Politics*, 32(3): 333-353.

Vanberg, G. (2001) Legislative-Judicial Relations: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Constitutional Review, *American Journal of Political Science*, 45(2): 346-361.