

Comparative Political Analysis

210052 BAK7, 6 ECTS
Autumn 2017

Course Details:

Tuesday, 15h00-16h30 (NIG 2nd floor, A212)
First class: 10.10.2017; Last class: 30.01.2017

Instructor:

Mariyana Angelova, M.A.
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Office Hours:

Tuesday 17h00-18h00

Course Description:

This course provides an introduction into comparative politics in English. A central goal is to introduce students to basic theoretical and empirical concepts of comparative politics and exercise scientific writing. This is a highly demanding class, with a lot of reading and writing assignments. The evaluation of the class will be based on students' active class participation, written weekly assignments, and a short term paper.

Course Structure:

Required Readings, Class Participation & Weekly Assignments

This is a seminar class, which means that students are expected to read the required readings and participate in class discussions.

The first two substantive sessions will deal with practical approaches to empirical research and writing in political science. Here we will learn what is a research topic, how to generate research questions, how to develop hypotheses and how to structure our research design. Students can use this knowledge for scientific reading and writing in this class, as well as outside of it.

The remaining part of the class will discuss selected topics from comparative politics: party systems, electoral systems, voting behavior, legislatures, governments, legislative politics, courts, and supranational institutions.

Most sessions will be based on two texts. The first text is usually from the lecture book by Caramani (2017). The lecture book provides an overview into a given subtopic and should give a wide background for the understanding and discussion of the scientific articles. The remaining readings(s) are selections of seminal scientific articles from top political science journals like the American Journal

of Political Science and the American Political Science Review. These will be the primary focus of class discussions and weekly assignments. Class participants are expected to generate at least three questions suitable for discussion (based on the article texts) and write a short summary of every required article *for each class*. This means three questions and one summary every week.

Term Paper

Students are expected to write **one empirical research paper (3000-4000 words)** and **submit their progress** in stages throughout the seminar with strict deadlines end of October (research topic), end of November (research question), and mid January (first draft). Submitted research questions will be uploaded on Moodle so that class participants can read them and be prepared to discuss them in two class sessions. In this way students are expected to learn how to provide constructive feedback, train their critical thinking and facilitate collaborative work. Additionally, every student is expected to write **constructive feedback on the first draft of two term papers from their peers** and deliver these by the last class session. Ideally the two papers will be selected from the same research topic as the one the student reviewer is working on in his or her paper. Students can use their peers' feedback to improve their term papers. Additionally, i will provide two full days, during which students can come to my office hours and discuss their draft papers with me in person. **The final deadline for the research paper is the 26th of February 2018 18h00.**

Recommended Readings

Besides the required reading, the syllabus lists recommended readings. These are *not required to pass the class and will not be tackled in the discussions*. The recommended readings should give a starting point for the term paper and provide some basis for the interested reader after the class ends.

Course Readings and Assignments (required readings only)

For more information on the required reading and recommended readings see the detailed reading plan below.

Tuesdays 15h00-16h30	Readings & Assignments
Week 1 (10.10)	Introduction & Plan <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No readings
Week 2 (17.10)	Empirical Research I: Research Question and Hypotheses <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Powner (2015) Ch. 1 & 2 ▶ 3 Questions due Monday (16.10) 13h00
Week 3 (24.10)	Empirical Research II: Literature Review and Research Design <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Powner (2015) Ch. 3 & 4 ▶ 3 Questions due Monday (23.10) 13h00
Week 4 (31.10) Research Topic	Comparative Politics: Overview <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Caramani (2017) Ch. 1- Caramani (2017) • Tsebelis (1999) APSR ▶ 1 summary + 3 questions (on article) due Monday (30.10) 13h00 ▶ Research topic (one sentence) due Monday (30.10) 13h00
Week 5 (07.11)	Electoral Systems <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Caramani (2017) Ch. 10 - Gallagher (2017) • Chang and Golden (2007) BJPS ▶ 1 summary + 3 questions (on article) due Monday (06.11) 13h00
Week 6 (14.11)	Parties and Party Systems <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Caramani (2017) Ch. 12 - Katz (2017) • Caramani (2017) Ch. 13 - Caramani (2017) • Tavits (2008) BJPS ▶ 1 summary + 3 questions (on article) due Monday (13.11) 13h00
Week 7 (21.11)	Voting Behavior <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Kedar (2005) APSR ▶ 1 summary + 3 questions (on article) due Monday (20.11) 13h00
Week 8 (28.11) Research Question	Legislatures <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Caramani (2017) Ch. 7 - Kreppel (2017) • McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) AJPS ▶ 1 summary + 3 questions (only 1 article) due Monday (27.11) 13h00 ▶ Research Question (300-500 Words) due Monday (27.11) 13h00

Week 9 (5.12)	<p>Research Question Discussion I</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • read research questions by your peers uploaded on Moodle ▶ no assignments
Week 10 (12.12)	<p>Research Question Discussion II</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • read research questions by your peers uploaded on Moodle ▶ no assignments
17.12-02.01	<p>Winter Holidays</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • take a break • work on your draft term paper
Week 11 (09.01)	<p>Government Types</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Caramani (2017) Ch. 8 - Müller (2017) • Thies (2001) AJPS ▶ 1 summary + 3 questions (only 1 article) due Monday (8.01) 13h00
Week 12 (16.01) First Draft	<p>Legislative Politics in Parliamentary Systems</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Martin and Vanberg (2014) AJPS ▶ 1 summary + 3 questions due Monday (15.01) 13h00 ▶ First draft of your term paper (min 1500 Words) due Monday (15.01) 13h00
Week 13 (23.01)	<p>Courts</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Caramani (2017) Ch. 9 - Stone Sweet (2017) • Carruba et al. (2008) APSR ▶ 1 summary + 3 questions due Monday (22.01) 13h00
Week 14 (30.01) Feedback on Drafts	<p>Supranational Institutions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Caramani (2017) Ch.23 - Hix (2017) • Hix (2002) AJPS ▶ 1 summary + 3 questions due Mo (29.01) 13h00 ▶ Written feedback on 2 draft papers by peers due Mo (29.01) 13h00
26.02.2018 Term Papers	<p>Submission of Term Papers</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Term paper (3000-4000 words) due Monday (26.02) 18h00 ▶ If you wish to get your grades before 28.02.2018, submit your term papers at the latest 12.02.2018 18h00

Important Deadlines Overview:

- **Weekly deadlines**

- Questions (three): every Monday by 13h00, first time 16.10.2017, last time 29.01.2018 (Moodle)
- Summaries (one): every Monday by 13h00, first time 30.10.2017, last time 29.01.2018 (Moodle)

- **Other deadlines**

- Research Topic: week 4, Monday 30.10.2017 13h00 (Moodle)
- Research Question (400-500 words): week 8, Monday 27.11.2017 13h00 (Moodle)
- First Draft (min 1500 words): week 12, Monday 15.01.2017 13h00 (Moodle)
- Written feedback on to draft papers: week 14, Monday 29.01.2018 13h00 (Moodle)
- Term Paper (3000-4000 words): Monday 26.02.2018 18h00 (Moodle)

Course Requirements:

Grading of the course will be based on the following components: **participation (15%), weekly assignments (40%), and term paper (45%)**. Students who decide to drop out of the class have to deregister until Friday 13.10.2017 23h59. Please note that students who do not deregister and do not attend the class will receive a grade "fail" at the end of the class.

Minimum Requirements: The minimum requirement is the completion of all three class components: participation, weekly assignments, term paper (see above). This means that, in order to be graded, you need to complete each component (not necessarily successfully). For example, you can NOT master the homework assignments and the class participation which make up 60% of the final grade and decide not to write the final paper, or vice versa. **In order to be graded class participants need to 1) attend at least 12 out of 14 class sessions (where the first session is obligatory for everybody), 2) submit all 9 summaries, and 3) submit their term paper, within the specified deadlines.** On time submissions of the written assignments increase the grade of each assignment, late submissions decrease the grade of each assignment. Each written assignment (questions, summaries, feedback, research question, draft paper) has a predefined deadline (see the session table). It is possible to submit the written assignments after these deadlines. Such submissions will be treated as late and penalized with a grade deduction. Note that written assignments can NOT be submitted later than 26.02.2018 18h00. In other words submissions later than this final deadline will not be accepted (exceptions will be made only for reasonable grounds, e.g. sickness).

Each component (participation, weekly assignments and term paper) will be graded separately. The overall grade will be the weighted average of the grades from the three components (15% participation, 40 % weekly assignments, 45 % term paper), whereby it is not necessary that each of the components is successful. In other words, students are allowed to fail any of the three components, and can still pass the class as long as the overall grade is equal or above 4.0.

Plagiarism and Ghostwriting are strictly forbidden. To make sure that these rules are not violated in some occasions students will be required to provide an oral discussion of their written work.

- **Participation (15%)**: class attendance, assigned literature, questions, class discussions
 - Students are expected to attend all class sessions. **You are allowed to miss up to two classes unexcused during the semester.** Students are expected to complete the assigned required reading each week and participate actively in class discussions. This means that you should be prepared to summarize and discuss any required reading when called upon. These summaries should discuss the puzzle, the research question, describe the approaches, key arguments, and the results provided in the required readings. To facilitate class discussions you should generate at least three questions suitable for discussion. Questions should be inserted in an excel sheet (use template) and uploaded on Moodle before each session by Monday 13h00 (no exceptions). All questions will be uploaded on Moodle before the session.
 - **Detailed grading**:
 - * Each class session will be graded separately and the overall grade for the participation component will be the average of all session.
 - * The grades for each session start with a 4.0 (mere class attendance)
 - * The submission of 3 questions increases the grade with 1 point
 - * On time submissions increase the grade by 0.5 points, late submissions decrease the grade by 1 point
 - * Participation in class discussions (verified with a signature in a discussion list after the class) increases the grade with 2 points
- **Weekly Assignments (40%)**: summaries on required articles and feedback on peers' draft papers:
 - **Nine summaries on required articles - due Mondays 13h00 (week 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14)**

Students are expected to submit one summary (400-600 words) for each required article (follow instructions on Moodle). Note that summaries will be written only on scientific articles and not book chapters. The texts from the Caramani (2017) lecture book do not have to be summarized. There is only one article for each session. *Summaries are due each Monday until 13h00.* There are no assigned articles for week 1, week 2 and week 3, so the first summary is due for week 4 on Monday, 30.10 until 13h00. There are no assigned summaries for week 9 and week 10. In these sessions we will discuss your research questions in class. **Note that all submitted summaries will be uploaded on Moodle - graded and anonymized - so that students can learn from the writing of their peers.**
 - **Feedback on two draft papers - due Monday 29.01.2017 13h00 (week 14)**

Every class participant will receive **two draft papers** and will be required to write a constructive review to each of the three draft papers following the review guidelines on Moodle. Students will have approximately 10 days for review and are required to submit

their written **feedback on the two draft papers until Monday 29.01.2017 13h00 (week 14).**

– **Component grading: general information**

- * The weekly assignments consist of 9 written summaries and written feedback on 2 draft papers by your peers.
- * Each summary will be graded by the instructor, the feedback will be graded by your peers (with an option that the instructor adjusts the grade if necessary). The overall grade for the weekly assignments component will be calculated as the weighed average of the graded summaries (90%) and the feedback on draft papers (10 %).

– **Detailed grading of summaries:**

- * Summaries will be assigned a grade between 5.0 (fail) and 1.0 (excellent) by the instructor.
- * Students need to submit all 9 summaries (no exceptions)! If one or more summaries are missing, then the student can not pass the class even if his or her overall grade is higher than 4.0.
- * On time submissions increase the grade of each summary by 0.5 points, late submission decrease the grade for each summary by 1 point (even when the summary is already graded as 5.0).
- * Summaries which are treated as plagiarism or ghostwriting will be graded as 5.0 and reported to the university administration. In such cases no bonus grading will be applied. In repeated occasions of plagiarism or ghostwriting students risk to fail the class.

– **Detailed grading of feedback on draft papers:**

- * The grades for each feedback on the draft paper start with a 4.0.
- * Each submission increases the grade by 1 point, of not submitted the grade is lowered with 1 point. This practically means that not submitted feedback will be graded as 5.0
- * On time submissions increase the grade by 0.5 points, late submissions decrease the grade by 1 point
- * The author of the draft paper will evaluate each feedback - not helpful (-1 point), descriptive (0 points), helpful (+1 point), very helpful (+1 point). If the feedback was not helpful, the grade will be lowered with 1 point. If the feedback consists of a mere description what was done good and bad, without any constructive suggestions, the grade remains intact. Helpful feedback (with constructive suggestions) increases the grade with 1 point. Very helpful feedback (many useful suggestions for improvement) increases the grade with 2 points.

• **Term Paper (40%):** 3000-4000 words due Monday 26 February 2018 18h00

Students are expected to write an empirical research paper with a length between 3000 and 4000 words. The research paper should identify a puzzle and pose a research question embedded in the scientific literature, develop theoretical expectations (testable hypotheses) and propose a research design to test the theoretical expectations (detailed instructions on Moodle). Class participants are NOT required to gather data and analyze it. In essence, the term paper should include a title page, an abstract, an introduction, literature review, theory, a research design section, conclusions and references, and is practically a half of a standard

scientific article.

Students are expected to work on the term paper throughout the whole semester and deliver their written progress on the set deadlines (no exceptions, on time submissions increase the section grade, delayed submissions will be penalized with lower grading).

- *Week 4: Research Topic (one sentence) due Monday 30.10.2017 13h00 via Moodle:*
Students are expected to choose their research topic from one of the weekly substantive topics (e.g. Courts from week 13) on Moodle by Monday 30.10 13h00. Your research topic should fit within the general framework - comparative politics. Topics not listed in this syllabus are not recommended, because students will give feedback to each other and need to have some background. In case of doubt about your research topic and research question, please discuss it with the instructor.

- *Week 8: Research Question (400-500 words) due Monday 27.11.2017 13h00 via Moodle:*
Students are encouraged to start working actively on the paper in November (after the introductory sessions into scientific writing). They can start reading the required and recommended literature from a selected week and derive their research question from the literature. This is the hardest part of the research paper, so take your time, search for further literature, read efficiently different papers related to your topic. Students are required to submit a one-page summary of their research question and the literature leading to it by Monday 27.11 13h00 via Moodle. **Research questions submitted on time give a bonus to the final grade of your term paper, late or no submissions are penalized with lower grading.** In particular, on time submission of your research question increases the grade of the term paper by 0.3 points, late or no submission of the research question lowers the grade of the term paper with 0.3 points. Research questions will not be graded, their purpose is that you start working on your term papers early on.

- *Week 12: First draft (min 1500 words) due Monday 15.01.2018 13h00 via Moodle:*
Students are encouraged to work actively on the paper and complete their first draft in December and January. Students should submit a first draft of their term paper by Monday 15.01.2018 13h00 on Moodle. **Draft papers submitted on time give a bonus to the final grade of your term paper, late or no submissions are penalized with lower grading.** In particular, on time submission of your draft paper increases the grade of the term paper by 0.3 points, late or no submission of the draft paper lowers the grade of the term paper with 0.3 points. Draft papers will not be graded, their purpose is that you work on your term paper early on.

- *Final Deadline: 26th of February 2018 18h00 via Moodle:*
The final deadline for the term paper is the 26th of February 2018 18h00. There will be no exceptions for the submission deadline. Delayed submissions will be penalized with lower grading - 0.5 points for every delayed 6 hours. Papers will NOT be accepted 48h after the deadline. Students who submitted their term paper too late (with more than 48 hours delay) or did not submit their term papers, can not pass the class, even if their overall grade is higher than 4.0. If students want to receive their final grade before the end of February 2018, they will need to submit their term paper

at the latest by Monday 12.02.2018 18h00 on Moodle.

– **Detailed grading of term papers:**

- * Term papers will be assigned a grade between 5.0 and 1.0 by the instructor
- * Every 6 hours delay for the submission of the term paper decreases the grade of the term paper with 0.5 points. Note that term papers will not be accepted 48 hours after the deadline.

Brainstorming and discussions in groups are allowed, but own writing is required:

You are encouraged to meet with your peers and discuss in groups your further readings and your understanding of them. Group discussions outside of the class are encouraged - they facilitates brainstorming and understanding. If you find an interesting article, do share it with your peers. Note that all written assignments should be written by yourself and can not be a copy or a transformed version of your peers' work. Students may not give or get any unauthorized or excessive assistance in the preparation (ghostwriting) of any of the written assignments. Students are allowed, but not encouraged to investigate a similar research question or the same research question. In case that students decide to investigate a similar or the same research question they should derive the research question from the literature on their own way and propose their own theoretical arguments and own research design to test their hypotheses. If students do no copy from each others written work, their papers will be completely different even if they address the same topic and investigate the same research question. In other words, feel free to share your ideas with others, you will not be penalized if your peers decide to investigate the same idea. Students are, however, not encouraged to work on the same research question which their peers are already working on. To avoid any complications do not take your peers ideas one to one, you can build on them. In any case do not write your paper on the basis of your peers' written work. Papers which investigate identical research questions AND have similar structure of the argument and writing will be treated as plagiarism and will not be accepted. You are welcome to visit me in my office hours if you have concrete questions on certain papers you have already read. Please notify me in advance, so that i can look at the paper too.

Technical Instructions:

Note that some of the required articles might change, in case i find a better suiting article (more interesting) for the class discussion. I will inform you of any changes in the syllabus in advance.

All supplementary material for the class including various templates and guidelines will be available via Moodle. Students should submit all their written work on Moodle. All summaries will be graded and uploaded in an anonymized form on Moodle. Students will be able to read all submitted summaries, which should facilitate the learning process.

Academic Honesty Policy Summary:

In addition to skills and knowledge, University of Vienna aims to teach students appropriate Ethical and Professional Standards of Conduct. The Academic Honesty Policy exists to inform students and Faculty of their obligations in upholding the highest standards of professional and ethical integrity. All student work is subject to the Academic Honesty Policy. Professional and Academic practice provides guidance about how to properly cite, reference, and attribute the intellectual property of others. Any attempt to deceive a faculty member or to help another student to do so will be considered a violation of this standard. In other words, plagiarism and ghostwriting are strictly forbidden. To make sure that these rules are not violated in some occasions students will be required to provide an oral discussion of their written work.

Authorship

The student must clearly establish authorship of a work. Referenced work must be clearly documented, cited, and attributed, regardless of media or distribution.

Declaration

Online submission of, or placing one's name on an assignment, or any course document is a statement of academic honor that the student has not received or given inappropriate assistance in completing it and that the student has complied with the *Academic Honesty Policy* in that work.

Consequences

The instructor may impose a sanction on the student that varies depending upon the instructor's evaluation of the nature and gravity of the offense. Possible sanctions include but are not limited to, the following: (1) Require the student to redo the assignment; (2) Require the student to complete another assignment; (3) Assign a grade 5 (fail) to the assignment; (4) Assign a final grade of 5 (fail) for the course. A student may appeal these decisions according to the Academic Grievance Procedure. (See the relevant section *here*)

Detailed Readings Plan:

Week 1 (10.10): Introduction & plan

No readings

Recommended: Learning strategies

Oakley, B. (2014) *A mind for Number: How to Excel at Math and Science (Even if You Flunked Algebra)*, New York: Penguin.

Week 2 (17.10): Empirical Research I: Research Question & Hypotheses

Powner, L. (2015) From Research Topic to Research Question, in L. Powner (Ed.) *Empirical Research and Writing. A Political Science Student's Practical Guide*, Los Angeles: CQ Press, pp. 1-19. (Chapter 1)

Powner, L. (2015) From Research Question to Theory to Hypothesis, in L. Powner (Ed.) *Empirical Research and Writing. A Political Science Student's Practical Guide*, Los Angeles: CQ Press, pp. 21-54. (Chapter 2)

Week 3 (24.10): Empirical Research I: Literature Review & Research Design

Powner, L. (2015) Doing Pre-Research, in L. Powner (Eds) *Empirical Research and Writing. A Political Science Student's Practical Guide*, Los Angeles: CQ Press, pp. 55-80. (Chapter 3)

Powner, L. (2015) Choosing a Design That Fits Your Question, in L. Powner (Ed.) *Empirical Research and Writing. A Political Science Student's Practical Guide*, Los Angeles: CQ Press, pp. 81-108. (Chapter 4)

Recommended:

Research Design and Writing:

Geddes, B. (2003) *Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory building and research design in comparative politics*, Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press.

King, G., R. Keohane, S. Verba (1994) *Designing Social Enquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Powner, L. (2015) *Empirical Research and Writing. A Political Science Student's Practical Guide*, Los Angeles: CQ Press. (remaining chapters from 5- to 11 on qualitative and quantitative research, writing up your research, practicing peer review and preparing presentation and publishing)

Gschwend, T. and F. Schimmelfennig (2007) *Research Design in Political Science. How to Practice what they Preach*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Case Selection

Mahoney, J., and G. Goertz (2004) *The Possibility Principle*, *The American Political Science Re-*

view, 98(4): 653-669.

Seawright, J. and J. Gerring (2008) Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research, *Political Research Quarterly* 61(2): 294-308.

Quantitative and Qualitative Research:

Abadie, A., A. Diamond, J. Hainmueller (2015) Comparative Politics and the Synthetic Control Method, *American Journal of Political Science*, 59(2): 495-510.

Collier, D (2011) The comparative method, in A. W. Finifter (Ed.) *Political Science: The State of the Discipline*. Washington DC: APSA.

Gerring, J. (2004) What Is a Case Study and What is It Good For?, *The American Political Science Review*, 98(2): 341-354.

Gerring, J. and R. McDermott (2007) An Experimental Template for Case Study Research, *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(3): 688-701.

Lieberman, E. (2005) Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research, *The American Political Science Review*, 99(3): 435-452.

Sekhon, J. (2004) Quality Meets Quantity: Case Studies, Conditional Probability and Counterfactuals, *Perspectives on Politics*, 2(2): 281-293.

Publications:

King, G. (2006) Publication, Publication, PS, *Political Science and Politics* 39: 119-125.

Writing Style:

Sylvia, P. (2007) How to Write a Lot: A Practical Guide To Productive Academic Writing, Washington DC: APA.

Strunk, W. and E. White (2000) The Elements of Style, 4th Edition, Massachusetts: Pearson.

Week 4 (31.10): Comparative Politics: Overview

Caramani, D. (2017) Introduction to Comparative Politics, in D. Caramani (Ed.), *Comparative Politics*, 4th Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1-17. (Chapter 1)

Tsebelis, T. (1999) Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis, *The American Political Science Review*, 93(3): 591-608.

Recommended:

Veto Player Theory - Foundational Work

- Tsebelis, G. (1995) Decision making in political systems: Veto players in presidentialism, parliamentarism, multicameralism and multipartyism, *British journal of political science*, 25(3): 289-325.

- Tsebelis, T. (1999) Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis, *The American Political Science Review*, 93(3): 591-608.
- Tsebelis, G. (2002) *Veto players: How political institutions work*, Princeton University Press.
- Tsebelis, G. and Money, J. (1997) *Bicameralism*. Cambridge University Press.
- Tsebelis, G. and Chang, E. (2004) Veto players and the structure of budgets in advanced industrialized countries, *European Journal of Political Research* 43(3): 449-476.

Applications/Extensions of the Theory:

- König, T., Tsebelis, G. and Debus, M. (Eds) (2010) *Reform processes and policy change: veto players and decision-making in modern democracies* (Vol. 16), Springer Science and Business Media.
- West, K. and Lee, H. (2014) Veto players revisited: Internal and external factors influencing policy production, *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 39(2): 227-260.

Veto Players and Cabinet Formation

- Eppner, S. and Ganghof, S. (2017) Institutional veto players and cabinet formation: The veto control hypothesis reconsidered, *European Journal of Political Research*, 56(1): 169-186.
- Tsebelis, G. and Ha, E. (2014) Coalition theory: a veto players? approach, *European Political Science Review*, 6(3): 331-357. (Veto players and Cabinet Formation)

Veto Players and Discretion of Central Banks

- Bernhard, W. (1998) A political explanation of variations in central bank independence, *American Political Science Review* 92(2): 311-327.
- Bodea, C. and Hicks, R. (2015) Price stability and central bank independence: Discipline, credibility, and democratic institutions, *International Organization*, 69(1): 35-61.
- Keefer, P. and Stasavage, D. (2003) The limits of delegation: Veto players, central bank independence, and the credibility of monetary policy, *American political science review*, 97(3): 407-423.

Veto Players and Referendums, Voter Turnout, Bureaucratic Corruption, Human Rights, Investments

- Bagashka, T. (2014) Unpacking corruption: The effect of veto players on state capture and bureaucratic corruption, *Political Research Quarterly*, 67(1): 165-180.
- Carlin, R. and Love, G. (2013) What's at stake? A veto-player theory of voter turnout, *Electoral Studies*, 32(4): 807-818.
- Hug, S. and Tsebelis, G. (2002) Veto players and referendums around the world, *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 14(4): 465-515.
- Justesen, M. (2014) Better safe than sorry: How property rights and veto players jointly affect economic growth, *Comparative Politics*, 46(2): 147-167.

- Lupu, Y. (2015) Legislative veto players and the effects of international human rights agreements, *American Journal of Political Science* 59(3): 578-594.
- MacIntyre, A. (2001) Institutions and investors: The politics of the economic crisis in South-east Asia, *International Organization*, 55(1): 81-122.

Week 5 (07.11): Electoral Systems

Gallagher, M. (2017) Elections and Referendums, in D. Caramani (Ed.), *Comparative Politics*, 4th Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 173-187. (Chapter 10)

Chang, E., and M. Golden (2007) Electoral systems, district magnitude and corruption, *British Journal of Political Science*, 37(01): 115-137.

Recommended:

Overview Articles

Benoit, K. (2007) Electoral Laws as Political Consequences: Explaining the Origins and Change of Electoral Institutions, *Annual Review of Political Science* 10: 363-90.

Bormann, N. and M. Golder (2013) Democratic electoral systems around the world, 1946-2011, *Electoral Studies*, 32(2): 360-369.

Golder, M. (2005) Democratic electoral systems around the world, 1946-2000, *Electoral Studies*, 24(1), 103-121.

Grofman, B. (2016) Perspectives on the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, *Annual Review of Political Science*, 19, 523-540.

Electoral Systems and their Origins

Benoit, K. (2000) Which electoral formula is the most proportional? A new look with new evidence, *Political Analysis*, 381-388.

Boix, C. (1999) Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies, *American Political Science Review*, 93 (3): 609-24.

Carey, J., and S. Hix (2011) The Electoral Sweet Spot: Low-Magnitude Proportional Electoral Systems., *American Journal of Political Science*, 55(2): 383-397.

Christensen, R., and P. Johnson (1995) Toward a context-rich analysis of electoral systems: the Japanese example, *American Journal of Political Science*, 39(3): 575-598.

Colomer, J. (2005) It's parties that choose electoral systems (or, Duverger's laws upside down), *Political studies*, 53(1): 1-21.

Cox, G. (1997) *Making Votes Count: strategic coordination in the worlds' electoral systems*, Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

Cusack, T., T. Iversen, and D. Soskice (2007) Economic interests and the origins of electoral systems, *American Political Science Review* 101(03): 373-391.

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Carey, J. (2007) Political Institutions, Competing Principals, and Party Unity in Legislative Voting, *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(1): 92-107.

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Week 7 (21.11): Voting Behavior

Kedar, O. (2005) When Moderate Voters Prefer Extreme Parties: Policy Balancing in Parliamentary Elections, *American Political Science Review*, 99(2): 185-200.

Recommended:

Anderson, C. (2007) The end of economic voting? Contingency dilemmas and the limits of democratic accountability, *Annual Review of Political Science*, 10, 271-296.

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Binder, S. (1999) The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947-96, *The American Political Science Review*, 93(3): 519-533.

Binder, S., E. Lawrence, S. Smith (2002) Tracking the Filibuster, 1917 to 1996, *American Politics Research*, 30(4): 406-422.

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Week 9 (5.12): Research Question Discussion I

Week 10 (12.12): Research Question Discussion I

17.12.2017-02.01 - Winter Holidays

Week 11 (09.01): Government Types

Müller, W. C. (2017) Governments and Bureaucracies, in D. Caramani (Ed.), *Comparative Politics*, 4th Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 136-154. (Chapter 8)

Thies, M. (2001) Keeping Tabs on Partners: The Logic of Delegation in Coalition Governments, *American Journal of Political Science*, 45(3): 580-598.

Recommended:

Laver, M. and N. Schofield (1990) *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Week 12 (16.01): Legislative Politics in Parliamentary Systems

Martin, L. W., and G. Vanberg (2014) Parties and policymaking in multiparty governments: The legislative median, ministerial autonomy, and the coalition compromise, *American Journal of Political Science*, 58(4): 979-996.

Recommended:

Carroll, R., and G. Cox (2012) Shadowing Ministers Monitoring Partners in Coalition Governments, *Comparative Political Studies*, 45(2), 220-236.

Kim, D., and G. Loewenberg (2005) The Role of Parliamentary Committees in Coalition Governments Keeping Tabs on Coalition Partners in the German Bundestag, *Comparative Political Studies*, 38(9): 1104-1129.

Laver, M. and K. Shepsle (1996) *Making and Breaking Governments*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Martin, L., and G. Vanberg (2005) Coalition policymaking and legislative review, *The American Political Science Review*, 99(01): 93-106.

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Week 13 (23.01) Courts

Stone Sweet, A. (2017) Constitutions, Rights, and Judicial Power, in D. Caramani (Ed.), *Comparative Politics*, 4th Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 155-172. (Chapter 9)

Carrubba, C., M. Gabel, and C. Hankla (2008) Judicial behavior under political constraints: Evidence from the European Court of Justice, *American Political Science Review*, 102(04): 435-452.

Recommended:

Judges and Constitutional Politics

Shapiro, M., and A. Stone Sweet (1994) Special Issue: The New Constitutional Politics of Europe, *Comparative Political Studies*, 26(4): 397-420.

Stone Sweet, A. (2000) *Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Stone Sweet, A. and T. Brunell (1998) Constructing a Supranational Constitution: Dispute Resolution and Governance in the European Community, *American Political Science Review* 92(1): 63-80.

Stone Sweet, A. and T. Brunell (2004) *The Judicial Construction of Europe*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Vanberg, G. (2004) *The politics of constitutional review in Germany*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Weingast, B. (1997) The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law, *American Political Science Review*, 91(2): 245-263.

Legitimacy and Public Support

Caldeira, G. (1986) Neither the purse nor the sword: Dynamics of public confidence in the Supreme Court, *American Political Science Review*, 80(4): 1209-1226.

Clark, T. (2009) The separation of powers, court curbing, and judicial legitimacy, *American Journal of Political Science*, 53(4): 971-989.

Krehbiel, J. (2016) The politics of judicial procedures: The role of public oral hearings in the German constitutional court, *American Journal of Political Science*, 60(4): 990-1005.

McGuire, K., and J. Stimson (2004) The Least Dangerous Branch Revisited: New Evidence on Supreme Court Responsiveness to Public Preference, *Journal of Politics*, 66(4): 1018-1035.

Mishler, W., and R. Sheehan (1993) The Supreme Court as a Countermajoritarian Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions, *American Political Science Review*, 87(1): 87-101.

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Judicial Decision-Making and Legislation

McGuire, K. and G. Caldeira (1993) Lawyers, Organized Interests, and the Law of Obscenity: Agenda Setting in the Supreme Court, *American Political Science Review*, 87(03), 717-726.

Rogers, J. (2001) Information and judicial review: A signaling game of legislative-judicial interaction, *American Journal of Political Science*, 45(1): 84-99.

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Vanberg, G. (1998) Abstract Judicial Review, Legislative Bargaining, and Policy Compromise, *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 10(3): 299-326.

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Vanberg, G. (2001) Legislative-Judicial Relations: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Constitutional Review, *American Journal of Political Science*, 45(2): 346-361.

Week 14 (30.01): Supranational Institutions

Hix, S. (2017) The EU as a New Political System, in D. Caramani (Ed.), *Comparative Politics*, 4th Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 403-421. (Chapter 23)

Hix, S. (2002) Parliamentary behavior with two principals: Preferences, parties, and voting in the European Parliament, *American Journal of Political Science*, 46(3): 688-698.

Recommended:

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Hix, S., (2013) What's Wrong with the Europe Union and How to Fix it, John Wiley & Sons.

Hix, S. and B. Hyland (2011) The political system of the European Union, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

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Boranbay-Akan, S., T. König, and M. Osnabrgge (2016) The imperfect agenda-setter: Why do legislative proposals fail in the EU decision-making process?, *European Union Politics*,3: 1-20. (first published online)

Crombez, C. and S. Hix (2015) Legislative activity and gridlock in the European Union, *British Journal of Political Science*, 45(03): 477-499.

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Junge, D., T. König, and B. Luig (2015) Legislative gridlock and bureaucratic politics in the European Union, *British journal of political science* 45(04): 777-797.

Thomson, R., F. Stokman, C. Achen, and T. König (2006) The European union decides, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tsebelis, G. and G. Garrett, (2000) Legislative politics in the European Union, *European Union Politics*, 1(1): 9-36.

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Tsebelis, G. and X. Yataganas (2002) Veto Players and Decision?making in the EU After Nice, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40(2): 283-307.

Tsebelis, G. (2013) Bridging qualified majority and unanimity decisionmaking in the EU, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 20(8): 1083-1103.

König, T. and B. Luig (2014) Ministerial gatekeeping and parliamentary involvement in the implementation process of EU directives, *Public Choice*, 160(3-4): 501-519.

EU Parliament

Hix, S. (1998) Elections, parties and institutional design: A comparative perspective on European Union democracy, *West European Politics*, 21(3): 19-52.

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Hix, S., A. Noury, and G. Roland (2006) Dimensions of politics in the European Parliament, *American Journal of Political Science*, 50(2): 494-520.

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Hix, S. and A. Noury (2009) After enlargement: Voting patterns in the sixth European Parliament, *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 34(2): 159-174.

Hix, S. and B. Hyland, B. (2013) Empowerment of the European parliament, *Annual Review of Political Science*, 16: 171-189.

Hix, S., T. Raunio, and R. Scully (2003) Fifty years on: Research on the European Parliament, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 41(2): 191-202.

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European Court of Justice

Garrett, G. (1995) The politics of legal integration in the European Union, *International Organization*, 49(01): 171-181.

Stone Sweet, A. and T. Brunell (1998) Constructing a Supranational Constitution: Dispute Resolution and Governance in the European Community, *American Political Science Review* 92(1): 63-80.

Sweet, A. and T. Brunell, (2012) The European Court of Justice, state noncompliance, and the politics of override, *American Political Science Review*, 106(01): 204-213.

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Angelova, M., T. Dannwolf, and T. König, T. (2012) How robust are compliance findings? A research synthesis, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 19(8):1269-1291.

König, T. and L. Mäder (2014) The strategic nature of compliance: An empirical evaluation of law implementation in the central monitoring system of the European Union, *American Journal of Political Science* 58(1): 246-263.

Mastenbroek, E. (2005) EU compliance: Still a "black hole"?, *Journal of European Public Policy* 12(6): 1103-1120.

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Hobolt, S. and Tilley, J. (2014) Who's in charge? How voters attribute responsibility in the European Union, *Comparative Political Studies*, 47(6): 795-819.

Hix, S. and M. Marsh, M (2007) Punishment or protest? Understanding European parliament elections, *Journal of Politics*, 69(2): 495-510.