

**How robust are compliance findings? A research Synthesis**  
**(A Research Synthesis on EU Member States' Compliance with EU Directives)**

**Dataset Codebook**

**Version August 2012**

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## List of Variables

Variable Name	Short Description
<b>Study and Research Design Information</b>	
studyid	Study id (numerical code)
studyid.label	Study id (label)
type	Research design type: qualitative, quantitative, descriptive (numerical code)
type.label	Research design type: qualitative, quantitative, descriptive (label)
ncases	Total number of cases investigated in the coded article
<b>Dependent Variable Information</b>	
dv	Dependent variable category (numerical code)
dv.label	Dependent variable category (label)
dvcat	Dependent variable category (aggregated to three categories): numerical code for transposition, infringements, application
dvcat.label	Dependent variable category (aggregated to three categories): label
<b>Independent Variable Information and Effects on Compliance</b>	
ivnr	Independent variable count
indvar.author	Independent variable as specified by the author
indvar	Independent variable categorization (measurement level): numerical code
indvar.label	Independent variable categorization ( <i>measurement level</i> ): label
ivtheoryneu	Independent variable categorization ( <i>theoretical level</i> , adjusted labeling of the theoretical argument (for more info see below): numerical code
ivtheoryneu.label	Independent variable categorization ( <i>theoretical level</i> , adjusted labeling of the theoretical argument (for more info see below): labels
theoryeffect	Independent variable: direction of the <i>theoretical argument</i> on COMPLIANCE: numeric code
theoryeffect.label	Independent variable: direction of the <i>theoretical argument</i> on COMPLIANCE: label
significant	Significance level (for qualitative and quantitative studies, see below for more information): numerical code
significant.label	Significance level: label
<b>Country Information</b>	
austria	Country dummy
belgium	Country dummy
bulgaria	Country dummy
cyprus	Country dummy
czech_Republic	Country dummy
denmark	Country dummy
efta	Country group dummy (includes Iceland, Lichtenstein,

	<i>Norway, Switzerland)</i>
estonia	Country dummy
finland	Country dummy
france	Country dummy
germany	Country dummy
greece	Country dummy
hungary	Country dummy
ireland	Country dummy
italy	Country dummy
latvia	Country dummy
lithuania	Country dummy
luxembourg	Country dummy
malta	Country dummy
netherlands	Country dummy
poland	Country dummy
portugal	Country dummy
romania	Country dummy
slovakia	Country dummy
slovenia	Country dummy
spain	Country dummy
sweden	Country dummy
<i>turkey</i>	Country dummy
uk	Country dummy

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**Policy field information: CELEX Categorization**

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env_cons_health	Environment, consumers and health protection
agr_fish	Agriculture; Fisheries
energy	Energy
labour_social	Freedom of movement for workers and social policy
justice	Area of freedom, security and justice
transport	Transport Policy
economy	Economic and monetary policy and free movement of capital
tax	Taxation
internal_Market	Industrial policy and internal market
undertakings	Law relating to undertakings
services	Right of establishment and freedom to provide services
customs	Customs union and free movement of goods
competition	Competition policy
finance	General financial and institutional matters
exterior	External relations
eucitizenship	People's europe
all_no_diffenition	No specific policy field

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## 1. Information on this Codebook

The dataset is provided in two formats: R and Stata format (.dta). In R the value labels are included as string variables. In Stata the value labels are attached to the variables. For each variable the names of the numerical variables and the value labels are indicated in the codebook.

The dataset is accompanied by a codebook with coding instructions. The corresponding relational database is available from the authors on request.

## 2. Study and Research Design Information

### Study ID

Description:	Each study in the dataset was assigned a unique running number. The correct citation is provided in the column citation.
Variable name:	studyid
Variable label:	
Value label:	studyid.label /studyidlabel
For more information refer to Database Codebook:	1.1. Study ID

studyidnum	studyid	Citation
1	01 Duina (1997)	Duina, F. (1997) 'Explaining legal implementation in the European Union', International Journal of the Sociology of Law 25(2): 155–79
2	02 Knill and Lenschow (1998)	Knill, C. and Lenschow, A. (1998) 'Coping with Europe: the impact of British and German administrations on the implementation of EU environmental policy', Journal of European Public Policy 5(4): 595–614.
3	03 Lampinen and Uusikylä (1998)	Lampinen, R. and Uusikylä, P. (1998) 'Implementation deficit - why member states do not comply with EU directives?' Scandinavian Political Studies 21(3): 231–51.
4	04 Mbaye (2001)	Mbaye, H.A.D. (2001) 'Why national states comply with supranational law. Explaining implementation infringements in the European Union, 1972–1993', European Union Politics 2(3): 259–81.
5	05 Hille and Knill (2006)	Hille, P. and Knill, C. (2006) "It's the bureaucracy, stupid." The implementation of the <i>acquis communautaire</i> in EU candidate countries, 1999–2003', European Union Politics 7(4): 531–52
6	06 Duina and Blithe (1999)	Duina, F. and Blithe, F. (1999) 'Nation-states and common markets: the institutional conditions for acceptance', Review of International Political Economy 6(4): 494–530.
7	07 Haverland (2000)	Haverland, M. (2000) 'National adaptation to European integration: the importance of institutional veto points',

- Journal of Public Policies 20(1): 83–103.
- 8 08 Mastenbroek (2003) Mastenbroek, E. (2003) 'Surviving the deadline: the transposition of EU directives in the Netherlands', *European Union Politics* 4(4): 371–95.
  - 11 11 Dimitrakopoulos (2001) Dimitrakopoulos, D. (2001) 'Learning and steering: changing implementation patterns and the Greek central government', *Journal of European Public Policy* 8(4): 604–22.
  - 13 13 Jensen (2007) Jensen, C.B. (2007) 'Implementing Europe: a question of oversight', *European Union Politics* 8(4): 451–77.
  - 14 14 Berglund, Gande, Waarden (2006) Berglund, S., Gange, I. and Van Waarden, F. (2006) 'Mass production of law. Routinization in the transposition of European directives: a sociological institutionalist account', *Journal of European Public Policy* 13(5): 692–716.
  - 15 15 Haverland, Steunenberg and van Waarden (2008) Haverland, M., Steunenberg, B. and Waarden, F.V. (2008) 'Sectors at different speeds: analyzing transposition deficits in the European Union', *ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops*, Rennes, 11–16 April.
  - 16 16 Sverdrup 2004 Sverdrup, U. (2004) 'Compliance and conflict management in the European Union: Nordic exceptionalism', *Scandinavian Political Studies* 27(1): 23–43.
  - 17 17 Thomson (2007) Thomson, R. (2007) 'Time to comply: national responses to six EU labour market directives revisited', *West European Politics* 30(5): 987–1008.
  - 18 18 Perkins and Neumayer (2007) Perkins, R. and Neumayer, E. (2007) 'Do membership benefits buy regulatory compliance? An empirical analysis of EU directives 1978–1999', *European Union Politics* 8(2): 180–206.
  - 19 19 Bursens (2002) Bursens, P. (2002) 'Why Denmark and Belgium have different implementation records: on transposition laggards and leaders in the EU', *Scandinavian Political Studies* 25(2): 173–95.
  - 20 20 Bailey (2002) Bailey, I. (2002) 'National adaptation to European integration: institutional vetoes and goodness-of-fit', *Journal of European Public Policy* 9(5): 791–811.
  - 21 21 Falkner, Hartlapp, Leiber and Treib (2004) Falkner, G., Hartlapp, M., Leiber, S. and Treib, O. (2004) 'Non-compliance with EU directives in the member states: opposition through the backdoor', *West European Politics* 27(3): 452–73.
  - 22 22 Dimitrova, Rhinard (2005) Dimitrova, A. and Rhinard, M. (2005) 'The power of norms in the transposition of EU directives', *European Integration Online Papers* 9(16), available at <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2005-016a.htm> (accessed 4 July 2012).
  - 23 23 Toshkov (2008) Toshkov, D. (2008) 'Embracing European law: compliance with EU directives in Central and Eastern Europe', *European Union Politics* 9(3): 379–402.
  - 24 24 Thomson, Torenvlied, Arregui (2007) Thomson, R., Torenvlied, R. and Arregui, J. (2007) 'The paradox of compliance: infringements and delays in transposing European Union directives', *British Journal of*

- Political Science 37(4): 685–709.
- 25      25 Haverland and Romeijn (2007)      Haverland, M., Romeijn, M. (2007) Do member states make European policies work? Analyzing the EU transposition deficit, *Public Administration*, 85(3): 757–778.
  - 26      26 Steunenberg (2006)      Steunenberg, B. (2006) ‘Turning swift policy-making into deadlock and delay. National policy coordination and the transposition of EU directives’, *European Union Politics* 7(3): 293–319.
  - 28      28 Toshkov (2008)      Toshkov, D. (2008) ‘Embracing European law: compliance with EU directives in Central and Eastern Europe’, *European Union Politics* 9(3): 379–402.
  - 29      29 Keading (2008)      Kaeding, M. (2008) ‘Lost in translation or full steam ahead – the transposition of EU transport directives across member states’, *European Union Politics* 9(1): 115–43.
  - 30      30 Falkner and Treib (2008)      Falkner, G. and Treib, O. (2008) ‘Three worlds of compliance or four? The EU-15 compared to new member states’, *Journal of Common Market Studies* 46(2): 293–313.
  - 31      31 Borghetto (2006)      Borghetto, E., Franchino, F. and Giannetti, D. (2006) ‘Complying with the transposition deadlines of EU directives. evidence from Italy’, *Rivista Italiana di Politiche Pubbliche* 1(1): 7–38.
  - 32      32 Giuliani (2003)      Giuliani, M. (2003) ‘Europeanization in comparative perspective: institutional fit and national adaptation’, in K. Featherstone and C. Radaelli (eds), *The Politics of Europeanization*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 134–55.
  - 33      33 Mastenbroek and Keulen (2006)      Mastenbroek, E. and Van Keulen, M. (2006) ‘Beyond the goodness of fit: a preference-based account of europeanization’, in R. Holzhaecker and M. Haverland (eds), *European Research Reloaded: Cooperation and Integration among Europeanized States*, Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 19–42.
  - 35      35 Zubek (2005)      Zubek, R. (2005) ‘Complying with transposition commitments in Poland: collective dilemmas, core executive and legislative outcomes’, *West European Politics* 28(3): 592–619.
  - 36      36 Bugdahn (2005)      Bugdahn, S. (2005) ‘Of Europeanization and domestication: the implementation of the environmental information directive in Ireland, Great Britain and Germany’, *Journal of European Public Policy* 12(1): 177–99.
  - 37      37 Boerzel (2002)      Börzel, T.A. (2002) ‘Pace-setting, foot-dragging, and fence-sitting: member state responses to Europeanization’, *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40(2): 193–214.
  - 38      38 Boerzel (2000)      Börzel, T.A. (2000) ‘Why there is no “southern problem”. On environmental leaders and laggards in the European Union’, *Journal of European Public Policy* 7(1): 141–62.
  - 39      39 Boerzel (2006)      Börzel, T.A. (2006) ‘Participation through law enforcement – the case of the European Union’,

40	40 Linos (2007)	Comparative Political Studies 39(1): 128–52. Linos, K. (2007) ‘How can international organizations shape national welfare states? Evidence from compliance with European Union directives’, Comparative Political Studies 40(5): 547–70.
41	41 Sedelmeier (2008)	Sedelmeier, U. (2008) ‘After conditionality: post-accession compliance with EU – law in East Central Europe’, Journal of European Public Policy 15(6): 806–25.
43	43 Falkner, Hartlapp, Treib (2007)	Falkner, G., Hartlapp, M. and Treib, O. (2007) ‘Worlds of compliance: why leading approaches to EU implementation are only sometimes-true theories’, European Journal of Political Research 46(3): 395–416.
44	44 Koenig and Luetgert (2009)	König, T. and Luetgert, B. (2009) ‘Troubles with transposition? Explaining trends in member-state notification and the delayed
45	45 Luetgert and Dannwolf (2009)	Luetgert, B. and Dannwolf, T. (2009) ‘Mixing methods: an analysis of EU member state transposition patterns’, European Union Politics 10(3): 307–34.
48	48 Steunenberg and Toshkov (2009)	Steunenberg, B. and Toshkov, D. (2009) ‘Comparing transposition in the 27 member states of the EU: the impact of discretion and legal fit’, Journal of European Public Policy 16(7): 951–70.
49	49 Thomson (2009)	Thomson, R. (2009) ‘Same effects in different worlds: the transposition of EU directives’, Journal of European Public Policy 16(1): 1–18.

### Type of Research Design

Description:	This variable indicates the research design type in each coded study.
Variable name:	type
Variable label:	Type of Research Design
Value label:	type.label /typelabel
For more information refer to Database Codebook:	1.8. Research Design

Value	Label	Description
1	Quantitative	Inferential Statistics: the study applies inferential statistics (regression analysis)
2	Descriptive	Descriptive Statistics: the study evaluates quantitative data using descriptive statistics
3	Qualitative	Case Study: the study conducts case study analysis.

### Number of Cases



Description:	This variable indicates the number of cases analyzed in a given article. The values correspond to the number of cases as stated by the author of the article.
Variable name:	ncases
Variable label:	
Value label:	none
For more information refer to Database Codebook:	1.5. Total Number of Cases

### 3. Information on the Dependent Variable

#### Categorization of the Dependent Variable

Description:	Categorization of the dependent variable (type of non-compliance) in each coded study.
Variable name:	dv
Variable label:	
Value label:	dv.label/dvlabel
For more information refer to Database Codebook:	2. Dependent Variable Information

Value	Value Label
Transposition	
100	Transposition
<b>Duration</b>	
101	→until correct transposition
102	→until first instrument
104	→until last instrument
103	→duration delay
<b>Legal Implementation</b>	
110	→timely
120	→correct
130	→correct and timely
140	→pre Accession
<b>Actual Application</b>	
200	→Actual application
240	→Legal implementation and actual application
<b>Infringements</b>	
300	<b>Infringement</b>
301	→Formal Letter
302	→Reasoned Opinions
303	→Referrals

310	<b>Non-notification</b>
311	→ Formal Letter
312	→ Reasoned Opinions
313	→ Referrals
320	<b>Non conformity</b>
321	→ Formal Letter
322	→ Reasoned Opinions
323	→ Referrals
330	<b>Bad application</b>
331	→ Formal Letter
332	→ Reasoned Opinions
333	→ Referrals
340	<b>Non compliance with ECJ Judgments</b>
341	→ Formal Letter
342	→ Reasoned Opinions
343	→ Referrals
400	<b>Court Cases</b>
401	→ Non-notification
402	→ Non-conformity
403	→ Bad application
404	→ Non-compliance with a court judgment
410	<b>Court Judgments</b>
411	→ Negative for Member states
412	→ Positive for Member states
500	<b>Combinations</b>
501	→ Transposition, application and enforcement
502	→ Transposition and application
600	<b>Decentralized Enforcement</b>

### Dependent Variable Categorization (aggregated):

Description:	This variable indicates the aggregated category of the dependent variable (type of non-compliance) based on the variable dvcode.
Variable name:	dvcac
Variable label:	
Value label:	dvcac.label/dvcaclabel
For more information refer to Database Codebook:	

This variable is coded using the information from dv.code in the following way:

Values	Value labels	Corresponding categories from dvcode
1	Transposition	100:140
2	Infringements	300:343, also two particular article with dv.code equal to 411 and 500 which use infringement data.
3	Application	200, 240, 501, 502, 600

## 4. Information on the Independent Variables

### ID Independent Variable

Description:	This variable indicates the consecutive number of the independent variables in each coded study. The ID is an unique identifier within each study.
Variable name:	ivnr
Variable label:	
Value label:	
For more information refer to Database Codebook:	3.1. Numbering

### Independent Variable: Author

Description:	This variable indicates the name of the independent variable as specified by the author
Variable name:	indvar.autor/ indvarauthor
Variable label:	
Value label:	indvar.author/ indvarauthor
For more information refer to Database Codebook:	3.2 Name of the Independent Variable

### Independent Variable Categorization

Description:	This variable indicates the measurement of independent variable.
Variable name:	indvar/ indvar
Variable label:	
Value label:	indvar.label / indvarlabel
For more information refer to Database Codebook:	3.7. Operationalization Level: Categorization

value	value label
<b>Directive Characteristics</b>	
0100	<b>directive specific indicators</b>
0101	→length of deadline
0102	→commission directive
0103	→council directive
0104	→co-decision directive
0106	→length of text/number of recitals
0107	→discretion
0108	→quality/clarity of directive
0109	→new directive

0110	→amending directive
<b>Goodness of fit</b>	
0200	goodness of fit
0210	→directive requirements fit with national policy legacies/traditions
0211	→directive requirements fit with the organization of interest groups
0212	→directive requirements fit with norms
0213	→directive requirements fit with national institutions
0214	→directive requirements fit with the regulatory state
0220	→concerning financial costs
0230	→directive requirements fit with existing legislation
0231	→directive requirements fit with existing legislation:existence of a national policy
0232	→directive requirements fit with existing legislation:no need to change the national status quo
<b>EU Decision-Making Procedures</b>	
0300	<b>eu decision-making procedures</b>
0301	→involvement of the european parliament
0302	→decision rule in the council of ministers
<b>Member States Characteristics</b>	
0400	<b>member states' characteristics</b>
0401	→(effective) number of parties
0410	<b>→features of the political system</b>
0411	→→federalism
0412	→→corporatism
0413	→→veto players/points
0414	→→corruption
0415	→→degree of centralization
0416	→→regional autonomy
0417	→→level of democracy
0418	→→type of democracy
0419	→→type of the legal system
0420	<b>→economic and political features</b>
0421	→→weighted votes in the council of ministers
0422	→→net contributors to eu budget
0423	→→gdp (per capita)
0424	→→economic power
0425	→→population size
0426	→→power index
0430	<b>→national administration's characteristics</b>
0431	→→bureaucratic efficiency/resources
0432	→→size of bureaucracy
0433	→→transposition load
0434	→→fiscal resources
0440	<b>→coordination process features</b>
0441	→→involvement of national actors in the EU law-making process
0442	→→number of ministries involved in the implementation process
0443	→→political conflict between ministries
0444	→→clear responsibilities for transposition
0450	<b>→national control mechanisms</b>
0451	→→obligatory inspection
0452	→→discretion of inspectors

0453	→→difficulty if court access
0454	→→presence of fire-alarm mechanisms
<b>0460</b>	<b>→culture characteristics</b>
0461	→→three worlds of compliance
0462	→→respec of the rule of law
0463	→→type of the negotiation culture
0464	→→political culture
0470	<b>→other member states' characteristics</b>
0471	→→old members
0472	→→new members
<b>Enforcement mechanisms</b>	
0500	<b>enforcement control mechanisms on the eu level</b>
0510	<b>→infringement procedure</b>
0511	→→commission activity
0512	→→court judgement
0513	→→complaints by national actors
0520	<b>→saliency for the commission</b>
0521	→→commission disagreement
<b>Transposition process characteristics</b>	
0600	<b>transposition process characteristics</b>
0610	<b>→type of legislation used</b>
0611	→→primary legislation
0612	→→secondary legislation
0613	→→teritary legislation
0620	<b>→issue linkage</b>
0621	→→transposition package
0630	<b>→critical event</b>
0631	→→external shock
0632	→→election
<b>Government preferences</b>	
0700	<b>government preferences</b>
0710	<b>→law specific government positions</b>
0711	→→incentive to deviation
0712	→→outvoted on the eu level
0713	→→saliency
0714	→→conflict in the council of minsiters
0720	<b>→government specific positions</b>
0721	→→position on the left-right dimension
0722	→→position on the eu dimension
0723	→→ideological range in the government
0724	→→ideological range in the parliament
0725	→→type of government
<b>Citizens' Attitudes</b>	
0800	<b>attitudes of member states' citizens</b>
0810	<b>→attitudes towards the eu</b>
0811	→→support for eu membership
0820	<b>→attitudes towards specific policies</b>
0830	<b>→attitudes towards other issues</b>
0831	→→support for democracy
<b>Policy Learning</b>	
0900	<b>policy learning</b>

0901	→length of eu membership
0902	→single loop learning
0903	→double loop learning
<b>No appropriate category</b>	
1000	no appropriate category

### Theoretical Argument of the Independent Variable

Description:	This variable indicates the general theoretical argument behind the analysis of each independent variable in the coded studies.
Variable name:	ivtheoryneu
Variable label:	
Value label:	ivtheoryneu.label/ivtheoryneulabel
For more information refer to Database Codebook:	4 Explanatory Factors: Theory and 4.1 Definition and Theory and 4.2 General Code instructions

value	ivtheoryneu
<b>Management School</b>	
010100	capacity
010101	Institutional decision-making capacity
010102	Interministerial coordination problems
010103	Administrative efficiency
010104	Positive public support
010105	Favourable culture
010600	Learning
<b>Enforcement School</b>	
020100	Preferences
020200	Supranational monitoring and enforcement
020300	National monitoring and enforcement
020400	Power (EU)
<b>Other Categories</b>	
010200	Good fit
010700	Low complexity of EU laws
040000	no appropriate category
050000	control variable

### Effect of the Independent Variable on Compliance

Description:	This variable indicates the direction of the effect of the independent variable as specified in “ivtheoryneu” ( <i>good fit, interministerial cooprdination problems, administrative efficiency</i> etc.) on <b>compliance</b> .
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Additional Information	<p>In order to make the direction of the effects of similar theoretical arguments comparable across studies, we adjusted the direction of the effects as they were reported in the studies. First we adjusted the reported effects to the specification of the independent variable and the theoretical concept it represents. We looked whether the independent variable as specified and measured by the author e.g. indicates bureaucratic efficiency or bureaucratic inefficiency and then in this example reversed the effect of bureaucratic inefficiency. In this particular case all positive(negative) effects of bureaucratic inefficiency on compliance were set to be equal to a negative(positive) effect of bureaucratic efficiency on compliance. Second we further adjusted the effects to the reported measurement of the dependent variable. Here we looked whether the study analysis compliance (e.g. timely, correct transposition) or non-compliance (e.g. infringements, delay, non-notification) and reversed all effects on non-compliance. For example all positive(negative) effects of bureaucratic efficiency on non-compliance were set to be negative(positive) effects of bureaucratic efficiency on compliance.</p> <p>To make a concrete example , Mbaye (2001) finds that the variable „regional autonomy“ has positive effect on non-compliance measured by the number of times a member state has reached the judicial phase of the infringement procedure. The existence of regional autonomy that might interfere into the transposition process implies that there are more veto players that influence the transposition process and thus the „institutional decision making capacity“ of the member state is lower. Accordingly, Mbaye (2001) finds that <i>lower</i> level of institutional decision making capacity increases (has positive effect on) <i>non-compliance</i>, which we take as identical to saying that <i>higher</i> levels of institutional decision-making capacity are found to increase (have positive effect on) <i>compliance</i>. Following this logic, the variable „theoryeffect“, in this particular case, shows that „institutional decision making capacity“ (as coded in the variable theoryeffectneu) increases compliance.</p>
Variable name:	theoryeffect
Variable label:	
Value label:	theoryeffect.label/theoryeffectlabel
For more information refer to Database Codebook:	Based on the codings explained in sections 4.3, 3.9 and 3.10.

Values	Value labels
0	positive
1	negative
2	unclear

## Significance Level

Description:	This variable indicates the level of significance identified in the analysis of the study. We differentiated between quantitative and qualitative studies. While we coded differentiated information for the quantitative analyses, our coding of the qualitative study only distinguishes between confirmed or not confirmed.
Variable name:	significant
Variable label:	
Value label:	significant.label/significantlabel
For more information refer to Database Codebook:	3.11 Significance/Confidence Level

Values	Value labels
<i>Inferential Statistics</i>	
0	not significant $p > 0.05$
1	significant $0.01 \leq p < 0.05$
2	highly significant $p < 0.01$
10	significant: effect too complex
11	not significant: effect too complex
<i>Case Studies</i>	
3	not confirmed
4	confirmed
5	strongly confirmed
<i>Not Specified (all types of studies)</i>	
9	unclear



## 5. Country Information

### Country Dummies

Description:	For each study, the countries were coded that were included in the analysis. From this information, we generated a series of dichotomous variables listed below.
Variable name:	See list below
Variable label:	Country Name
Value label:	0 “not included” 1 “included”
For more information refer to Database Codebook:	1.7. Sample Countries.

---

**Variable name**

---

austria  
belgium  
bulgaria  
cyprus  
czech\_republic  
denmark  
efta  
estonia  
finland  
france  
germany  
greece  
hungary  
ireland  
italy  
latvia  
lithuania  
luxembourg  
malta  
netherlands  
poland  
portugal  
romania  
slovakia  
slovenia  
spain  
sweden  
turkey  
uk

## 6. Policy field information

### Celex Policy Fields (as of October 2010)

Description:	<p>For each study, the policies were coded that were included in the analysis. From this information, we generated a series of dichotomous variables according to the EURLEX directory codes indicated below.</p> <p>Since none of the studies investigated in this article base their selection of policy fields on theoretical grounds, to identify common policy fields we followed the policy division in the directory codes on the European Union's website Eur-lex – <i>Access to European Union Law</i>, available at <a href="http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm">http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm</a> (last accessed 4 July 2012). We used the policy categorization from Eur-lex as of October 2010. Lately the European Union extended its competences in numerous policy fields and thus the number of policy fields also increased. The article does not include three policy fields which were added lately. These are „Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments“, „Science, information, education and culture“, „Common foreign and security policies“. Celex policy field dummies were created using the policy field dummies from above.</p>
Variable name:	See list below
Variable label:	Country Name
Value label:	0 “not included” 1 “included”
For more information refer to Database Codebook:	1.3. Policy Fields

Variable name	Variable label (CELEX Policy Field)
env_cons_health	Environment, consumers and health protection
agr_fish	Agriculture & Fisheries
energy	Energy
labour_social	Freedom of movement for workers and social policy
justice	Area of freedom, security and justice
transport	Transport Policy
economy	Economic and monetary policy and free movement of capital
tax	Taxation
internal_market	Industrial policy and internal market
undertakings	Law relating to undertakings
services	Right of establishment and freedom to provide services
customs	Customs union and free movement of goods
competition	Competition policy
finance	General financial and institutional matters

exterior	External relations
eucitizenship	People's europe
all_no_differentiation	No specific policy field was specified by the author