In a recent publication, Partheymüller and Kritzinger (2026) propose a two-stage framework for proportional representation systems, testing it in the case of Austria’s 2024 national election and the subsequent coalition formation. They extend existing research on winner–loser dynamics by adding three factors that may shape democratic satisfaction in contexts of rising populism: populist attitudes as a negative filter, losers’ consent, and perceptions of procedural fairness regarding electoral integrity and coalition bargaining. Austria provides a particularly suitable case: the far-right FPÖ won 28.8 percent of the vote in 2024, becoming the strongest party for the first time, yet was excluded from government after the longest coalition negotiations in Austrian history. The coalition between ÖVP, SPÖ, and NEOS took office in March 2025, decoupling electoral victory from executive power for the FPÖ.
What methods were used?
The study uses the AUTNES Online Panel Study 2017–2024, which recorded Austrian voters’ attitudes not only before and after the election, but also after coalition formation. The authors draw on three waves: during the campaign in September 2024, after the election in late September and October 2024, and after coalition formation in March 2025. Rather than focusing only on overall levels of satisfaction, the authors examine transitions between satisfaction and dissatisfaction over time. This allows them to assess whether voters moved from being satisfied to dissatisfied, or vice versa, at each stage of the post-electoral process. Key predictors include stage-specific winner–loser perceptions, populist attitudes, norms concerning the need to accept unfavourable democratic decisions, perceived electoral integrity after the election, and perceived fairness of the coalition formation process.
Drivers of Democratic (Dis-)Satisfaction
The descriptive analysis shows that FPÖ supporters were already the least satisfied group during the campaign. Their satisfaction declined further after the election and reached an even lower point after the new government formed. The empirical tests reveal that perceived winner-loser status did not significantly drive changes among FPÖ voters in the post-election stage. Instead, changes in satisfaction were most strongly driven by perceived electoral integrity despite a plurality win. Additionally, populist attitudes had a marginal effect on reinforced dissatisfaction, indicating that anti-elite attitudes blocked positive re-evaluations of democracy. In the post-coalition stage, a clearer winner-loser pattern emerged: perceiving the FPÖ as having lost the bargaining stage increased dissatisfaction. Interestingly, the small part of FPÖ voters that still considered the party to be the winner, also was more prone to increased democratic satisfaction. Further, perceived unfairness of the process, especially due to exclusion of the plurality winner, was an important driver of dissatisfaction. Populist attitudes contributed more significantly to reinforcing dissatisfaction in the second stage. Lastly, weaker losers’ consent also raised the likelihood of shifting into dissatisfaction.
Overall, the findings show why it is useful to distinguish between the post-election and post-coalition stages. The framework is especially relevant for proportional systems with coalition governments, where electoral victory does not automatically translate into executive power. It may be less applicable in systems where the governing party or parties are already clear on election night.
What are the broader implications?
The analysis highlights the importance of procedural fairness, democratic norms, and populist attitudes for understanding democratic dissatisfaction. For mainstream parties, the findings underline a difficult trade-off: excluding populists from government may protect democratic quality, but it can also deepen dissatisfaction among their supporters. The authors caution that preventing spirals of distrust and feelings of political marginalization is essential for democratic stability. This includes efforts to reduce anti-elite sentiment, strengthen democratic norms, protect electoral integrity, and avoid unrealistic expectations about plurality winners being automatic or unequivocal “winners” of government formation.
